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(WIDER) was established in 1984 and started work in 
Helsinki in the spring of 1985. The principal purpose of the 
Institute is to help identify and meet the need for policy- 
oriented socio-economic research on pressing global and 
development problems and their inter-relationships. The 
establishment and location of WIDER in Helsinki have been 
made possible by a generous financial contribution from the 
Government of Finland.
The work of WIDER is carried out by staff researchers 
and visiting scholars and through networks of collaborating 
institutions and scholars in various parts of the world.
WIDER1s research projects are grouped into three main 
themes:
I. Hunger and poverty - the poorest billion
II. Money, finance and trade - reform for world
development
III. Development and technological transformation - the
management of change
WIDER seeks to involve policy makers from developing 
countries in its research efforts and to draw specific 
policy lessons from the research results. The Institute 
continues to build up its research capacity in Helsinki and 
to develop closer contacts with other research institutions 
around the world.
In addition to its scholarly publications, WIDER issues 
short, non-technical reports aimed at policy makers and 
their advisers in both developed and developing countries. 
WIDER will also publish a series of study group reports on 
the basic problems of the global economy.
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PREFACE BY THE DIRECTOR
This monograph is part of a series being published by 
WIDER on the experience of developing countries with 
stabilization and adjustment programmes in the 1970s and 
1980s. Each study analyzes the package of policies 
implemented by a specific country; its relations with the 
IMF and World Bank; the effects of the policies on 
production, employment, the balance of payments and social 
welfare; and what other policies might have been followed 
instead.
The intention of the series is to assist developing 
countries to devise adjustment policies that would, while 
accomplishing desirable adjustment and growth objectives, 
simultaneously remain politically viable in the particular 
country settings studied.
For this purpose it was thought desirable to explore 
policy alternatives to the adjustment programmes being 
implemented. Built into the design of the series, therefore 
- and constituting indeed its special feature - is the 
requirement that each study include a 'counterfactual' 
exercise to illustrate the effects of alternative policies. 
Utilizing econometric models adapted or specifically 
developed for each country, the probable effects of 
alternative policy packages are estimated; the object was to 
see how far the balance-of-payments adjustment and growth 
goals of a particular programme might have been achieved at 
a possibly lower social cost with a different policy mix.
Each country study is written by an independent scholar 
and expert in the relevant country. First drafts of the 
studies in this series were discussed at the WIDER 
conference on stabilization and adjustment policies in 
developing countries which was held 19-22 August, 1986 in 
Helsinki. Each study has been reviewed by WIDER's research 
advisers for the project, Professors Gerry Helleiner and 
Lance Taylor, and revised substantively by the author as 
necessary; subsequent editing has been conducted under the 
overall supervision of Mr Robert Pringle, Senior Fellow, who 
serves also as editorial adviser on WIDER publications.
A companion volume by Professor Taylor summarizing the 
experience of the countries surveyed will draw broader 
implications for the theory and practice of stabilization 
and adjustment policies; this volume will be published by 
Oxford University Press. The individual country studies in 
this series will subsequently be grouped into separate 
volumes, also for eventual publication by Oxford University 
Press.
Lai Jayawardena 
Di rector 
March 1987
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Set against a background of almost continuous economic 
decline since independence in 1957, the stabilization and 
adjustment programme pursued by Ghana since 1982-83 is a 
qualified but also a considerable success. Certainly it has 
achieved stabilization and the first steps towards recovery. 
Some progress has also been achieved in rehabilitating basic 
services - essential for human, social, productivity and 
longer-term development reasons. But the sustainability of 
the economic recovery remains far from assured.
Real consumption per capita in Ghana has fallen by more 
than one-third from its peak in 1960. The growth of food 
production has lagged behind the growth of population for 25 
years. Wages probably cover only a half of the typical 
household expenditure. Incomes are supplemented by many 
illicit activities: moonlighting, taking bribes, stealing
information and products, sending women and children out to 
work for longer hours, and at the extreme the 'pawning' of 
children - i.e. selling children a family cannot support. 
Corruption is widespread throughout the public sector: 
investigations, tribunals, firings, trials and sentences 
abound but at best corruption is being beaten back very 
slowly.
The government's ability to provide benefits - however 
defined or distributed - declined rapidly in the 1970s. 
During much of the decade there was no economic policy in 
any coherent or operational sense. The infrastructure of 
transport, communications and public services were falling 
apart.
As the following paper makes clear, the economic decline 
stems from the fall in exports and the prolonged 
overvaluation of the cedi - related in turn to domestic 
political forces. The tendency to overtax and underpay cocoa 
producers is linked to the fact that the main cocoa-growing 
regions (Ashanti and Brong Ahafo) have been 'outsiders' in 
every government coalition except one. Ghana now faces debt 
service ratios of over 65 per cent for the foreseeable 
future. But no overall, coherent strategy for raising 
exports to meet minimum import requirements has been 
articulated.
The paper by Prof. Green draws many lessons from this 
experience not only for Sub-Saharan African countries but 
also for the World Bank and IMF. In his view, these lessons 
are probably applicable also to many economies in Asia, the 
Pacific, the Caribbean and Latin America.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ghana is a low-income economy. At independence in 1957 
it was a middle-income economy, with the highest GDP per 
capita in West Africa. The decline of the Ghanaian economy 
can be dated to 1960-61 or at the latest 1972-73; it is 
emphatically not the result either of 1974-75 or 1979-80 
shocks albeit these hastened decline.
Ghana is an import-strangled economy. The basic cause is 
that the level of exports, having oscillated downwards from 
1965 through 1983, is below that of 30 years ago, whether 
measured in terms of volume or real import capacity. One 
cause of the export decline is inadequate incentives, partly 
because of external terms-of-trade shifts but primarily from 
domestic ones relating to the overvaluation of the cedi and, 
for cocoa, excessive marketing costs plus taxation. This 
factor has been reinforced by the deterioration of the 
infrastructure and of the availability of incentive goods 
but these are themselves largely the result of the decline 
in exports. Unfortunately, devaluation and increases in 
grower prices do not automatically or immediately reverse 
the consequential causes which now have a life of their own. 
Import substitution has been increasingly ineffective 
because lack of import capacity and distorted profit 
opportunities have crushed the manufacturing sector.
Ghana is a hungry economy. Food production has been on a 
trend rate of growth below population for over 25 years. 
This is despite the fact that food prices have increased 
more rapidly than the consumer price index (at least at the 
retail and wholesale levels). By contrast with export and 
industrial raw material production, the food production lag 
is apparently largely independent of price distortions.
Ghana since 1983 (and in a broader sense since 1982) has 
been engaged in a stabilization and structural adjustment 
programme. Economic policy has been relatively orthodox with
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one and one half caveats: the programme was designed to
increase initial import levels by increasing net resource 
transfers; also, from 1985, raising (not lowering) both 
government revenue and expenditure relative to GDP has 
become a goal. On its face the programme is a success; the 
CAD is more manageable, imports have risen; GDP in 1984 and 
1985 rose over five per cent a year; and inflation fell from 
140 per cent in 1983 to 15 per cent in 1985, although it 
probably reached 30 per cent again in 1986.
Questions arise as to interpretation. 1983 was the third 
year of the worst drought in Ghana's post-1900 history; 1984 
and 1985 were climatically favourable. Increased import 
capacity presumptively would have caused some recovery 
whatever the policy package. The initial means to reducing 
the government financing requirement as a percentage of GDP 
concentrated on cutting real expenditure, even though the 
base tax/GDP ratio was almost the lowest in the world. 
Similarly the deterioration of most quality-of-life 
indicators cannot be said to be caused primarily by the 
stabilization programme but - at least until 1985-86 
little priority was given to halting or reversing them.
Analysis is hampered by inadequate data, especially on 
composition and levels of household income and consumption, 
and by data whose margins of error and inconsistency seems 
rather high. For example, in 1985 a 1.5 per cent rise in 
food production and a 2.6 per cent growth in population were 
officially recorded which contrast very oddly, a 15 per cent 
fall in food prices and clearly greater availability of food 
in both 1985 and early 1986.
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II. AN HISTORICAL PREFACE
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The structure of Ghana's economy was to a large extent 
shaped in 1880-1914. Rapid growth in cocoa, gold and to a 
degree log production for export was the engine of growth. 
Cocoa was an African industry (small and not-so-smallholder 
led, using Levantine middlemen and European import export 
houses and, in practice, more hampered than helped by 
government policy). It was based on 'surplus' land and 
labour and was the successor to smaller African rubber and 
palm oil export booms also marketed by European trading 
houses. Gold and timber were European industries using 
substantial European capital (including infrastructure), 
technology and middle through managerial level personnel 
combined with Ghanaian natural resources and 
unskilled/semi-skilled African labour.
The 1920s saw fairly rapid export-financed growth 
including both physical (transportation) and human (health 
and education) public sector infrastructure. The depression 
and World War II halted - or reversed - growth with export 
prices (and to a degree quantities) the engine of decline in 
the 1930s and shipping constraints in the 1940s.
The period from the late 1940s through 1960 was marked 
by renewed moderate to rapid growth. This was fuelled 
initially by rising export prices, followed by quantity 
growth (especially in timber and cocoa) and, later in the 
period, by drawing on reserves built up in the 1940s and on 
capital inflows.
Despite relatively high tax and marketing shares, cocoa 
incentives at least to 1960 were adequate to fuel an 
explosive rise in output from 195,000 tonnes in 1946 to
566,000 in 1964. This record suggests rapid planting up to 
the late 1950s; observers at the time believed the year in 
which substantial new (as opposed to fill-in and 
replacement) planting ceased was 1959 or 1960. Indeed
arguably the incentives and output growth were too high as 
Ghana's share of production was over 33 per cent and the 
price elasticity of demand was estimated at -0.1 to -0.4.
In 1960-61 a balance-of-payment and inflation crisis was 
contained. In part it was caused by overheating and in part 
by terms-of-trade worsening. The strategy of high growth by 
high public service expenditure was maintained - after 1960 
at the price of reduced personal consumption. However, it 
was increasingly hampered by lagging food output, increasing 
corruption, an unduly low proportion of investment in 
projects with the possibility of high short-run returns and 
a substantial proportion of ill-designed, over-costly and/or 
grandiose projects. Inflation rose, partly due to increasing 
borrowing requirements and a highly questionable choice of 
taxes, e.g. on transport, which maximized their secondary 
price impact and aggravated the food production constraint, 
and partly reflecting the growing food supply problem 
itself. The post-1962 cocoa price slump, the cuts in 
personal real incomes and the attempts to cut real military 
spending precipitated a coup in 1966.
1966-69 was marked by fairly orthodox stabilization. 
Within it, personal consumption recovered, cocoa grower 
incentives fell, government consumption (except military) 
fell and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) plummeted. The 
1969-72 civilian government sought to sustain the recovery 
in personal consumption, nominally at least to restore cocoa 
incentives and to return to a high GFCF/high growth path. 
The immediate cause of its collapse (i.e. first of its 
strategy and then of itself) was the continuation of a cocoa 
price slump until 1973. Output had already sunk below
400,000 tonnes by 1971 - or perhaps 420,000 including
smuggling (which became significant from the late 1960s as 
the real official price fell below the real price in the 
Cote d'Ivoire and Togo adjusting both for transport, 
intermediary and 'lubrication' costs and the overvaluation 
of Ghana's cedi vis-a-vis the CFA franc). A scissors between
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low export prices and a fiscal position precluding massive 
cocoa tax cuts prevented real price restoration and added 
reduced care and increased smuggling to the threats to 
output in the medium-term already posed by the negligible 
new planting and limited re-planting since 1960.
The 1973-79 military regime did not have an economic 
policy - at least not in any coherent or operational sense. 
By 1979 cocoa exports had fallen below 225,000 tonnes 
(perhaps 275-300,000 including smuggling). GDP and capital 
formation were declining; infrastructure and directly 
productive capacity were being eroded.
The 1979 First Rawlings government was an interim 
cleansing and hand-over to civilian rule regime. Its 
economic policy was anti-corruption, anti-exploitation and 
populism. The 1979-81 civilian government again had no 
operational economic policy. The 1979-80 oil shock 
exacerbated the ongoing decline; infrastructure and public 
services were falling apart, food scarcity was becoming 
acute and foreign resource transfers becoming negligible to 
negative.
5.
III. THE SECOND COMING (LANDING) OF THE FLIGHT
LIEUTENANT
At the end of 1981 with the economy in total crisis and 
the government moribund, Flight Lieutenant J. J. Rawlings 
returned to power, this time heading a mixed 
civilian/military government dedicated to structural changes 
in morality, production, social relations and efficiency.
Its first year in office (1982) was marked by an 
attempted 'bootstrap' stabilization programme. Real cocoa 
prices were raised by reducing the payment lag to growers 
from nine months to one month, a critical shift given the 
near 100 per cent rate of inflation of previous years. 
Attempts at improving transport, external balance and fiscal 
balance aroused some enthusiasm but, given the state of 
infrastructure and the levels of import capacity, were 
foredoomed. With some exception in the health service, 
attempts to reverse public service decline were ineffective; 
government wages/salaries were so low as to prevent normal 
workloads (assuming the workers were to survive) and/or to 
enforce corruption.
Attempts to improve social relations by price controls 
and to raise productive efficiency by fiat were totally 
ineffectual. Indeed, they completed the already 
well-advanced flight of most economic transactions from the 
ambit of state influence (and from plausible data on levels 
or relationships as well). The maintenance of an exchange 
rate of cedi 2.75 to the dollar against a rate of 30 to 40 
on a price-adjusted no revaluation basis was particularly 
damaging.
The attempted, and partially achieved, structural change 
in morality (anti-corruption/anti-exploitation) clearly 
destabilized production and increased risk premiums in the 
parallel economy. The threat to those exploiting rents led 
to a series of coup attempts; and the rhetoric scared
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potential external creditors and donors. Further, the
workers (defence of the revolution) committees were not 
necessarily competent to identify corrupt practices, to
participate in management, or to avoid dabbling in 
'chopping' as well as more proper 'fringe' benefits 
themselves. On balance they almost certainly did reduce 
corruption but both by mistakes and by frightening 
businesses their impact on production was on balance 
negative.
However, 1982 almost certainly laid the foundations for 
acceptance of the 1983-85 stabilization programme by
Ghanaians. The government created on image of honesty, 
concern and energy (notably lacking at least since 1972 
except for the first Rawlings government interlude) and a 
certain support base among peasants, the
bureaucratic/managerial professionals and - less firmly -
urban workers to go with its rank and file security service 
support. The defence committees and rural development bodies 
in total involved up to half a million active participants 
and substantially more supporters and contributors. Without 
this base the 1983 measures could not have been implemented 
given the backdrop of externally smiled upon military and 
middle class coup attempts to oust the PNDC and, in effect, 
restore the status quo of 1979-81.
By late 1982 the government had concluded that 
'bootstrap' stabilization, let alone recovery, was 
impossible and began serious explorations/negotiations 
toward a Fund/Bank-led, externally-supported programme. 
Before examining this programme, which came into operation 
in May 1983, it is useful to look at the working of the 
economy and the main social groups/economic actors.
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IV. THE WORKING(?) OF THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY
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The basic constraints on the Ghanaian economy are import 
capacity and food sector productivity.
The import constraint is most evident in respect to 
industry (operating inputs, spares), public services 
(mobility, drugs, etc) and infrastructure/transport 
(materials, replacement equipment, vehicles, fuel). However, 
it is equally critical to all three main exports - gold, 
timber, cocoa. In the first two cases the direct import link 
is clear; in the last it relates to implements, spray and 
sprayers. Further, transport weaknesses directly related to 
inadequate import levels of fuel, spares, vehicles and 
road/rail/harbour maintenance (and by the late 1970s 
rehabilitation or reconstruction) inputs hamper production 
and export in all three cases.
Food productivity is rather less affected by the import 
constraint. Most of the sector uses limited imports or 
import produced goods. However, transport does constrain 
areas from which output can come, physically and in terms of 
incentives, since some work suggests grower food prices 
(private) are 25 per cent lower ten miles off a motorable 
road. Similarly the main North highway's closure since the 
early 1980s adds up to 500 km to the travel distance on 
goods up and food down with evident price and fuel use 
implications. It is not clear, because of increasing cost 
and oligopsony margin spreads, whether or not real grower 
prices for food have kept pace with inflation especially 
outside the most accessible coastal and Ashanti region 
areas.
However, the basic bottleneck on food production appears 
to be lack of knowledge which has been locally tested and 
adapted and which is economically viable and user-friendly. 
Mechanized/irrigated agriculture is a disaster, e.g. in rice 
there is probably a net forex loss and the domestic price
was in 1984 three times import parity taken at the official 
rate and at least 1.5 times at a plausible shadow rate.
Public investment in Ghana has predominantly been 
complementary with private. It has largely been in
infrastructure and/or in directly productive activity in 
which there was little actual or likely private activity to 
be crowded out. At present public investment rehabilitation 
of infrastructural, export processing, incentive (basic and 
amenity consumer) goods and agricultural tool capacity would 
improve forex and profit availability and thus encourage 
additional private sector investment.
Public sector demands on real resources may have 
constrained private savings, although the dominant negative 
impact in the first half of the 1960s was to crowd out
personal consumption and in recent years the total of public 
sector consumption and investment have been low by world,
SSA and low income economy standards.
Public policy more broadly defined certainly has 
deterred private sector investment and encouraged smuggling 
savings out of Ghana and/or causing profits to be received 
elsewhere. In addition, by reducing the levels both of 
economic capacity and capacity utilization it has lowered 
actual savings levels as well as discouraging their 
investment in Ghana. As it happens these policies - e.g. 
overvalued exchange rate, high inflation with price controls 
and chaotic forex allocation - have in practice
discriminated against public enterprises who were less able 
to parallel market and less oriented to using dash (gifts) 
to secure appropriate papers and obligingly blind eyes. They 
have thus reduced the savings and ability to invest of the 
public sector even more sharply than that of the private 
sector.
Corruption, which was a prominent aspect of public 
policy over most of the period, clearly deterred saving and
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investment. First, it raised costs and increased risks. 
Second, it was unwelcome to at least some businessmen and 
would-be businessmen. Third, it diverted entrepreneurial 
talent into channels not related to raising output. Fourth, 
it both led to government decisions on bases other than 
public or national or normally-defined political goal 
attainment and occupied a high proportion of the time of 
many civil servants.
Except for public services which are fixed price at any 
one time with some shifts toward markup (including cost 
share), pricing is basically market clearing in respect to 
domestic market production and imports. Margins are, in 
general, higher in services than in physical production. 
Cost plus probably sets a bottom line for most enterprise 
prices albeit the plus element cannot be taken as a 
constant. In late 1985 and early 1986 many manufacturer and 
retailer prices remained constant for up to six months 
(including on pre-devaluation stocks after a 50 per cent 
devaluation) because goods were moving far more slowly than 
anticipated and subsequent price alterations suggest some 
downward flexibility as to 'acceptable' margins.
The extreme case of flexprice is food where 160 per cent 
price increases in 1983 fell to 40 per cent in 1984 
(negative in the second half year) and -15 per cent in 1985, 
reflecting the swing from disastrous to good weather. Export 
prices, except those of cocoa, are determined by world 
prices and the exchange rate. In the case of cocoa 
government tax policy and marketing costs (about 20 per cent 
and 45 per cent of export proceeds in 1985) are additional 
major influences. Low prices since 1965 resulted in low 
output or smuggled exports, especially for cocoa and shea 
nuts, with 1982-86 real price increases at least partially 
reversing both output falls and smuggling.
10.
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The presence of a very large parallel (illegal) economy, 
especially at import/export and trade levels, and of a large 
'informal' non-agricultural sector limits effective
description of interactions. The informal and parallel
sectors have survived better than most large scale units 
(public or private) implying lower import content and/or 
more adequate access to parallel market imports. Because 
they are under-recorded, it is quite possible that the GDP 
decline through 1983 in official data is overstated. By the 
same token the non-agricultural productive and service units 
most able to benefit from reduction of import strangulation
may well be medium and large scale in which case official
data would tend to overstate the 1984-85 recovery.
1 1.
V. SOCIAL GROUPS/ECONOMIC ACTORS: 1960-86
12.
The basic social (socio economic) groups or sub-classes 
are :
A. Peasants
i. Tree Crop 
ii. Annual Crop
B. Wage Earners
i. Public Sector 
ii. Private Sector
C. Salariat
i . Public Sector 
ii. Private Sector
D. Informal Sector
E. Business
i. Production 
ii . Commercial - Legal
iii. Commercial - Parallel
F. Armed Forces
G. Foreign Finance Sources
One problem in analysis is that there are a substantial 
number of mixed incomes. Most urban households are in both 
the wage earning and the informal sectors. Further, tree 
crop and annual crop agriculture are complementary in the 
main tree crop areas.
Tree crop growing peasants have fared badly since the 
early 1960s. The rates of tax and administration levies on
potential cocoa income has averaged well over 50 per cent.
Combined with overvalued exchange rates and a moderate trend
decline in real cocoa prices the decline in purchasing power 
has been extreme - how extreme depends on one's estimate of 
smuggled cocoa and the percentage of the Ivoirien or 
Togolese price growers receive from smugglers and/or 
neighbouring state middlemen. Smuggling apparently is 
marginal up to a real price differential (excluding 
transport and 'lubrication' costs) of say, 25 per cent.
Beyond that it becomes significant with the share in each 
region rising as the differential (at grower level) passes 
the tipping point which is higher the further he/she is from 
direct routes to the Cote d'Ivoire or Togo. 1985-86 
experience suggests this function operates in both
directions, i.e. lower differentials have a prompt effect on 
choices between smuggling (or selling to the smuggling 
market) and using grower co-op/Cocoa Board channels.
Annual crop farmers have fared somewhat better on
average. However, as real output of food per farming 
household has fallen significantly (probably about two per 
cent per year over 1973-83) there are likely to have been 
real income falls. Despite the fact that retail food prices 
have risen almost as fast as CPI, this probably does not 
hold for grower prices because of increased costs and
decreased availability (leading to greater oligopsony power) 
of transport. However, this generalization is subject to 
weather conditions by year and locality (1981-83 were 
drought years) and to location (the Northern Zone has fared 
worst).
Wage earners as of 1979 totalled about 480,000 in 
establishments of ten or more and probably were under
450,000 by 1983. Even accepting the World Bank's improbably 
low labour force estimate (37 per cent of population), in 
1980 the formal wage employment total was under 12 per cent 
of the labour force - 53 per cent peasant agriculture, 35 
per cent informal.
*
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75 per cent of wage employment in 1979 was public sector 
(roughly 40 per cent government, 17 per cent Cocoa Board, 18 
per cent other public enterprises). On the face of it 
minimum wages fell to 20 per cent of 1970 levels in real 
terms and average wages to 17 per cent by 1983. The decline 
was greater in the public sector.
These data indicate the squeeze on wage earners but 
overstate. Allowances, of which there are over 100 
varieties, rose very sharply relative to wages over the 
1970s. In the public sector they may have averaged 50 per 
cent of the wages in government and 75 per cent in 
enterprises while in the private they often exceeded wages.
Further, by 1982 hours worked in the government sector 
and Cocoa Board probably averaged 15 to 20 per week. 
Informal sector activity plus production for own use 
probably used twice as many hours and yielded an average 
income equal to wages while other household members informal 
sector incomes also on average probably approached wage 
income.
This estimate squares roughly with a very small 1983 
survey in an Accra slum (Nima-Mamobi) which showed
expenditure per household four times the minimum wage and 
three fifths of the estimated absolute poverty line 
budgetary requirement.
The salariat, which accounts for perhaps 10-15 per cent 
of wage earners, have fared still worse in relative real
income fall terms, at least in the public sector. In the
government, the minimum wage/top salary after tax 
differential fell by 1985 to 1 to 1.8. This was less true of 
the private sector.
However, a complicating element is that housing and, in 
the private sector, car provision which is a key
parallel-income production asset, could equal or exceed the
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apparent salary. Further, managerial and bureaucratic 
salariat members had opportunities for relatively lucrative 
skill (e.g. doctors' private practice) or job-related 
informal or parallel incomes. By and large, the more honest 
a salariat member, and especially the more conscientious in 
working full time, the worse he fared.
The informal sector consists of a small entrepreneuridl 
minority, a large body of petty service or craft business 
self employed and a significant number of casual or small 
unit self employed. On average, real incomes fell, though 
probably not as fast as for wage earners. However, those 
entrepreneurs able to fill production gaps or more 
frequently collect scarcity rents (including parallel market 
ones) were substantial net gainers.
The business sector performed poorly, especially for 
large, non-financial enterprises and for production (as 
opposed to commercial) enterprises/capitalists more 
generally. The only gainers in real terms were rent 
collectors - usually in the parallel market and/or having 
'bought' access to scarce government allocated resources.
The armed forces fared better (i.e. saw less worsening 
of their real incomes, especially at 'other ranks' level) 
than most social actors. Their wages performed little better 
but they received food and housing for themselves and their 
fami lies.
Foreign finance sources did not lose drastically over 
1973-82, except for direct investors who saw little or no 
formal returns remitted (informal is another matter) and 
their assets run down physically and in real value. 
Multilateral and bilateral donors, export credit agencies 
and commercial lenders largely steered clear of Ghana except 
in special cases - e.g. rural water development and palm oil 
development. Certainly, significant commercial credit 
arrears were accumulated and some supplier credits were
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quasi-unilaterally rescheduled. However, the former were on 
transactions into which the sellers had almost certainly
built substantial margins for possible late payment and the 
latter were on contracts which, even when no corrupt 
practices were involved, were usually massively overpriced.
Their importance as of 1982 was that without more 
finance in general and, in particular finance to support a
growth in imports, no feasible rehabilitation and recovery
and probably no feasible stabilization scenario could be 
composed. It was this realization which led the PNDC
(Provisional National Defence Council) government to alter 
its adjustment tactics, and perhaps strategy, radically in 
1983.
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VI. DISTRIBUTION AND GROWTH
In Ghana, redistribution away from export crop growers 
to urban areas and to the state has probably worsened income 
distribution. Probably because the core of tree crop growers 
who produce the bulk of output still have incomes well above 
the national average. More critical it has reduced exports 
and thus import capacity and possible growth rates. 
Certainly in Rawlesian terms this redistribution was 
unsound.
Redistribution away from food crop growers has been less 
(and primarily by inability to raise output and secondarily 
by rising imperfect market grower price to retail price gaps 
as there has never been a significant state marketing 
presence in domestic foods). What there has been clearly 
worsens income distribution. Whether, given other 
constraints, it has radically reduced food production is 
less clear.
Reductions in real wages have worsened income 
distribution and reduced productivity. While real salary 
declines have improved urban income distribution, they have 
caused the public sector and the economy to lose a high 
proportion of the skilled and professional personpower it 
had trained. For example, by 1984 about 1,200 of 1,600 
Ghanaian doctors were practising outside Ghana.
The 'rise' of the informal sector has clearly 
facilitated urban survival. However, much of it has low 
productivity it terms of personal income levels and - in a 
less warped economic context at least - negligible or 
negative national economy value.
'Legitimate' business decline has perhaps lessened 
inequality but that is less important than its negative 
impact on the investible surplus. Parallel business (and 
associated informal sector members) has done well, but this
has worsened income distribution, diverted resources into 
channels adding little or nothing to national output and has 
eroded the real incomes of the bulk of the labour force.
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VII. THE POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION
19.
The political economy of distribution in Ghana has been 
regional as well as sub-class. Most notably, the tendency to 
overtax and underpay cocoa producers is not separable from 
the fact that main cocoa-growing regions (Ashanti and Brong 
Ahafo) have been 'outsiders' in every government coalition 
except the 1969-72 Busia one. Interestingly the PNDC 
government has shown concern for raising real grower prices 
since its inception although these regions are usually 
viewed as at least passively hostile to it.
The outlying regions, notably Northern, Upper, Western 
and sometimes Volta, have tended to line up against the 
inner and rather economically better off regions, i.e. 
Eastern, Central, Brong-Ahafo and Ashanti. The Accra region, 
like Sekondi-Takoradi in the West, has been a swing area 
with urban informal and organized labour (not by any means 
always congruent in interests or demands) dominant and 
business and professional classes usually secondary in 
political influence.
Organized labour was a factor in bringing the Nkrumah 
government to power. More consistently it has been a power 
in breaking governments - the initial honeymoon usually 
being followed by bitter divorces. Relative to the urban 
informal sector and the majority of the peasantry, organized 
labour was relatively well off until the 1970s. Today a 
formal sector job, including allowances, is not adequate for 
household survival but is an assured base from which to 
build other incomes and/or a revival in real wages.
Like organized labour, the urban informal sector, 
excluding its elite and parallel strata, initially supported 
populist or purported populist governments (Nkrumah, 
Acheampong, Liman, Rawlings) but then subsided into 
disillusion with all governments, with the possible 
exception of the Rawlings interim regime and perhaps the
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PNDC governments.
The informal elite, notably 'market mammies', have been 
a well-organized pressure group effective in forcing 
retreats from policies hostile to them (including by the 
PNDC) and in operating effective pseudo or quasi oligopoly 
'rings'. On the face of it food trading, at least at retail 
level, should be competitive. However, the uniformity of 
prices, parallel price falls late in the day and quantities 
of perishable produce regularly thrown away do tend to 
corroborate the now universal view of Ghanaians that in fact 
the markets are managed in an oligopsonistic manner.
Led by professional organizations, and the traditional 
(chiefly) leadership, the middle classes have traditionally 
backed conservative governments, distrusted populist 
governments and have sought (notably successfully late in 
the Acheampong-Akuffo period) to organize opposition to 
oppressive ones. The difference is that the traditional 
leadership sub-class has in practice been easier to buy 
and/or co-opt. They have always, however, been somewhat 
fragmented and appear especially so now because the 
coherence, honesty and willingness to use professional 
skills of the PNDC government appeals to a large fraction 
while an equally large one distrusts its populist approach 
to income distribution and a smaller one accuses it of 
having sold its soul to the IMF.
The security forces have a chequered political history. 
They have been responsible for overthrowing all three 
civilian governments, forcing changes of leadership in two 
military ones and overthrowing a third. The balance of power 
seems to have shifted to lower level commissioned officers 
and rank and file who are well disposed to the PNDC even 
though it is in no real sense a military government.
Business interests as such have not in practice been 
taken very seriously by any pre-PNDC government. Each has
had, used and been used by particular businesses and has 
moved against those it believed inimical to it. After 
initial deep hostility (in part inherited from the interim 
Rawlings government and related more to overt and pervasive 
corrupt government official-private enterprise symbiosis 
than to any formal political economic ideology) the PNDC 
appears to be viewing enterprises (private and public, 
Ghanaian and foreign) rather more pragmatically in terms of 
how they might serve its goals and what (semi-market 
oriented, general, non-corrupt) policies might further such 
an effort. A tentative positive response, including the 
re-emergence of some parallel market activity into visible 
(and less certainly legal) channels, appears to have taken 
place on the business side.
Over 1965-1981, and especially after 1969, government's 
ability to provide benefits, however defined or distributed, 
declined. Its fall in real resources to provide services 
(including payoffs) and its demonstrated inability to 
achieve economic growth or to maintain real incomes led 
partly to hostility but perhaps even more to exit from the 
political marketplace. Since 1981 this deterioration has 
been reversed up to a point. There is a partially restored 
belief that the government can achieve economic gains 
overall so arguments on how to distribute (bid for) them are 
once more live. Despite limited actual results to date, 
there is a parallel belief that more health and education 
will be provided so that bidding for these has also revived. 
While this renewed credibility is welcome in the sense of 
marking a return of more Ghanaians to participation in the 
political aspects of civil society, it also leads to risks 
of unrealisable expectations and anger at the slowness with 
which gains become available to anyone. The PNDC is clearly 
being judged by higher standards than the Liman 
administration and may or may not be able to meet the new 
minimum acceptable performance levels.
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VIII. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POVERTY/SURVIVAL MECHANISMS
22.
This sketch conveys the thrust of economic decline but 
not its full human dimensions. By 1982-83 about half the 
urban and over two thirds of the rural population were below 
the absolute poverty line - a situation worse than the 
average for low income SSA. The estimated average daily 
calorie intake in 1982 was 68 per cent of requirements.
Public service deterioration was even more marked. From 
an early 1970s level of two persons per year, visits to 
public sector health facilities declined to 0.7 in 1979 and 
0.4 in 1983 (and by the latter year up to half were in 
Christian Health Association of Ghana facilities).
The costs of these declines show in the Quality of Life 
Indicators table, e.g. child malnutrition, average life 
expectancy at birth, infant mortality. Their costs to 
present and future output should also be clear. Sick, 
malnourished people cannot work long or hard and the 
declining quality of education and high 'brain drain' bode 
ill for future managerial, administrative and professional 
capacity levels.
The main survival mechanisms can be characterized as 
stabilization (austerity), diversification (increasing range 
of income sources) and structural adjustment (changing basic 
occupation). The latter two categories include legal or at 
least quasi legal and parallel (illegal) variants sometimes 
both within the same household.
Stabilization - i.e. belt-tightening and doing without 
(including without belts) - has applied to 90 to 95 per cent 
of all Ghanaians; real per capita personal consumption has 
fallen over a third from its 1960 peak. Such austerity has 
been enforced on those - e.g. isolated peasant farmers - 
without few options and has been least intolerable for 
middle-class Ghanaians who already had a house, car and
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consumer hard goods.
But diversification has been essential for almost all 
wage and salary and non-agricultural informal sector 
households. (It is also prevalent in rural areas where 
additional craft or labour incomes could be found, but this 
probably affects a minority of households.) As noted 
earlier, even with allowances, wages cover half or less of 
the typical wage/salary household expenditure. Moonlighting 
(virtually all informal) and perquisite misuse (taking 
bribes, selling information and stealing products) by formal 
sector employees and sending more household members, 
especially women and children, out to work longer by members 
of both formal and informal sectors have been the means to 
diversification. Part of the income comes from handicraft 
and household own consumption food, part from food 
processing but most from (licit and illicit) commerce and 
bribery or theft.
Structural adjustment to new main activities is less 
common - and less commonly admitted, e.g. a university 
lecturer whose main household income comes from painting, 
the second largest contribution from wife's trading and the 
third largest from food gardening will still describe 
himself as a lecturer. Part of it does represent 
entrepreneurial creativity and socially useful adaptation. 
Much does not, e.g. the widespread smuggling, trading, 
currency and corrupt practices operations. The 'illegal' 
sector is either a small or a large one depending how one 
counts tens of thousands of farmers who smuggle on the side 
or sell to smugglers and scores of thousands of traders who 
operate on the maxim 'if you buy parallel you must sell 
parallel'. Operationally and in terms of policy targets this 
group of contextually constrained 'illegal' sector members 
should probably be excluded here and treated with other 
'diversifications'.
What low (ex post) and middle-income households have 
achieved is survival. Survival has been a remarkable 
acievement - but a limited one. Declines of up to one third 
in average calorie intake and the re-emergence at the end of 
the 1970s of two killer diseases, yellow fever and yaws, 
which had been eradicated in the mid-1950s, give an 
empirical idea of the fall and of the human misery and death 
resulting. So does even a casual visit to urban slums or 
poorer rural areas.
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IX. THE ROAD TO 'CHOPPING OFF THE BACKSIDE'
25.
Corruption and smuggling have never been absent from
Ghana. But until 1966 the latter was very low by West 
African standards and the former largely confined to a 
narrow circle of senior politicians and entrepreneurs. 
Corruption rose marginally through 1972, while remaining 
well below Nigerian levels, and smuggling became more than 
marginal as cedi overvaluation and cocoa underpayment rose.
1972-79 saw corruption become generic in the officer
corps and not uncommon in the public service with the main 
payers on the one hand rent seeking businessmen and on the 
other public services needing ordinary citizens. It would 
have been false to state at that point that the whole public 
sector was corrupted. Smuggling had risen with the steady 
rise of gaps in respect to exchange rates and cocoa prices.
1970s first Rawlings regime sought to administer a short 
sharp shock to rip corruption up by the roots. Several 
ex-leaders (including three ex-heads of state) were 
executed, hundreds imprisoned and/or confiscated, thousands 
affected by burning of 'market mammy' stalls (notably at 
Accra's main Makola market) and by forced sales at official
prices. A vein of public anger was tapped and, for the time
being, corruption was limited. However, smuggling and 
related parallel marketing were forced to hide - or to 
suspend operations temporarily - rather than halted as the 
economic imbalances which were their engine of growth were 
not tackled.
The Liman administration's major economic innovation was 
to achieve a system of generalized corruption and of 
generalized parallel marketing. The former has become known 
as 'chopping off the backside' (from the Westcoast verb 'to 
chop' literally meaning to eat but more generally to achieve 
an income or benefit by a non or illegitimate market 
channel). It was, and to the not negligible extent to which
it survives is, in effect a hierarchical patronage system of 
corruption (bribery, theft, misallocation) run by senior 
officials and managers. It arose because the top corrupt or 
would-be corrupt individuals feared 1979 would come again 
and felt the more middle and low level Ghanaians they 
co-opted into the system the safer they would be. It was 
furthered by the continued collapse of real wages and 
salaries, especially in the public sector, which meant that 
extra income from somewhere was vital to chop literally at 
all. Flight Lieutenant Rawling's angry and agonized claim 
that the Liman government had made corruption safe by 
corrupting the whole people overstates the degree of central 
planning involved and somewhat the numbers who were (are) 
'chopping' in one way or another but is basically a 
revealing insight into the process and its results. 
Smuggling became massive and prices even of legally imported 
goods were keyed to the parallel market because the degree 
of overvaluation (measured not in per cent or even 10's of 
per cents but 100's of per cents) had become ludicrously 
high.
Ghanaian 'chopping off the backside' is a perverted
relative of a mutual obligation approach sometimes called 
'I'll take care of you, if you take care of me'. Its more 
acceptable face is family, clan and home place loyalty and 
self help. During the recent crises years positive (for 
survival) adjustments to it included both separate
households of the same family and neighbouring households 
eating together and of sending children to relatives and 
friends who had more food. The grimmer face of the latter 
was 'child pawning', i.e. selling children a family could 
not support as household, farm, begging ring or market
labourers to help both the parents and siblings and the 
'pawns' to survive. Similarly, prepared food sellers 
(dominantly women with small stalls or portable 'kitchens') 
carried poor informal and wage earners until they could pay
a method of reducing the costs of highly erratic
individual incomes by pooling via the food seller whose
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revenue evened out as some paid up and others ran up debts.
The PNDC government has found fighting the widespread 
'chopping off the backside' system hard. Investigations, 
tribunals, firings, trials and sentences abound but - as 
Flight Lieutenant Rawlings not merely admits but asserts - 
at worst corruption is being held at bay and at best it is 
being beaten back very slowly. The Liman years did indeed 
build a school of minnows of petty corruption in which the 
sharks of major corruption can find cover and reproduce 
corrupt symbiotic links. This is assisted - and the PNDC 
hampered - by the continuing economic strains which force 
most workers into either quasi legal informal activity or 
petty parallel chopping.
Smuggling and related parallel marketing has declined. 
In part this may relate to a greater chance of detection and 
conviction, but largely it seems to flow from lessening the 
incentives to evade legal channels which flowed from massive 
overvaluation and underpayment. The PNDC's shift to using 
legal price signals/market mechanisms to complement improved 
anti-economic crime detection/enforcement appears to be a 
conscious one and to be having a measure of success. 
Certainly the large stores are now openly stocked to levels 
and ranges unknown since the late 1960s - a situation which 
is the result of parallel practices becoming less attractive 
in comparison to overt, legal ones as well as increased 
physical stock and flow levels. The increase in visible 
goods clearly cannot be used in any simple sense as an index 
of welfare improvement for another reason - most Ghanaians 
cannot afford to buy them. In the late 1960s one wage earner 
commented that in the late Nkrumah period he could rarely 
find goods in shops but when (if) he could then he could 
afford them but that then (under the MNC) there were lots of 
goods in the shops but at prices he could not afford. While 
the first half of the comment applies not at all to the 
1978-81 (Liman) period and very partially to the 1982 PNDC 
one the second half very much applies to 1985-86.
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X. THE ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME
The 1983-85 Stabi1ization/Adjustment programme was 
basically traditional or new orthodox with one exception. 
Even the exception, which is that a deliberate and immediate 
increase in import capacity was set as a target (via 
increased concessional finance), is becoming standard for 
SSA Fund/Bank programmes.
The programme was based on an initial shock treatment, 
particularly in respect to the exchange rate, followed by 
sustained gradualism and supported by gradually increasing 
real resource inflows over 1983-88.
Its main elements were:
Exchange rate policy, started with shock treatment in 
1983 when the cedi was devalued from 2.75 to the dollar to 
30 to the dollar followed by a rapid downward crawl in 1984 
to cedi 50. In 1985, for reasons which are not clear, the 
downward crawl slowed sharply with the rate reaching only 
60. (This was an unfortunate deviation because, for reasons 
extraneous to the programme, 1985 saw a once-off low 
inflation rate as a result of food price falls.) This was 
followed by a second shock devaluation to cedi 90 to the 
dollar. The third shock brought a move to a 'dirty' auction 
system in the second half of 1986 with a year-end rate of 
150 cedi (vs a parallel rate of the order of 200). This was 
not part of the IMF's initial or subsequent proposals.
Fiscal policy called for reducing the government 
borrowing requirement initially largely by expenditure cuts 
an approach which seems somewhat odd when government 
spending was under 10 per cent of GDP and the borrowing 
requirement under 3 per cent.
Monetary policy was designed to hold domestic credit 
formation below 20 per cent (largely by reducing government
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borrowing) and to achieve positive real interest rates to 
raise domestic savings. By 1985 interest rates had reached 
20 per cent.
Cocoa prices were to be raised rapidly in real as well 
as nominal terms. At least implicitly it was assumed that 
this would be consistent with raising the net government 
revenue from cocoa because domestic prices and Cocoa Board 
costs would grow less rapidly than cedi receipts would be 
boosted by devaluation. Additional foreign resources were to 
be mobilized from the Fund, the Bank and bilaterals to 
finance additional imports, service existing debt and reduce 
arrears.
Liberalization included ending almost all price 
controls, which were in any case ineffective and, except for 
cocoa, shea nuts and palm oil, all ceiling on agricultural 
purchase prices (which affected a negligible proportion of 
output in 1983). It also included no-questions-asked 
licensing of 'no forex' imports to capture the proceeds of 
outward smuggling for legal channels and to increase 
remittances from Ghanaians abroad (then probably of the 
order of 1,500,000 of whom 600,000 have since been 
repatriated by Nigeria) and to switch smuggled imports into 
channels allowing duty collection. Import licensing except 
for 'no forex' imports was to be retained and made more 
efficient by systematic prioritization.
Inflation was to be reduced sharply from the 50 per cent 
to 116 per cent rates which had characterized the late 1970s 
and early 1980s (albeit the 1982 rate had been 22 per cent). 
This was seen as possible because for most transactions, at 
least at retail level, it was believed that prices were 
related to the parallel exchange rate, not the wholly 
artificial official one.
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The programme's results were mixed but in its own terms 
basically satisfactory. However, several weaknesses emerged 
which were outside the initial programme and raise doubts as 
to whether its targets were comprehensive enough and its 
instruments appropriate, especially in respect to public 
expenditure.
Price increases rose to 122 per cent in 1983 (145 per
cent food and 100 per cent non-food) but fell to 40 per cent 
in 1984 (11 per cent food and 69 per cent non-food) and 12 
per cent in 1985 (-11 per cent food and 50 per cent
non-food). A plausible preliminary 1986 estimate is 33 per 
cent (15 per cent food, 50 per cent non-food) but this may 
be optimistic as in both 1984 and 1985 non-food prices 
increased by more than the increase in the price of forex 
(69 per cent to 60 per cent in 1984, 35 per cent to 20 per 
cent in 1985). Over the course of 1986 the exchange rate 
fell from 60 to 150 cedis per dollar or 150 per cent 
although, as noted, the initial fall to 90 cedis had a 
lagged and squeezed effect on prices because of demand 
constraints and the same may have been true of the auction 
system related depreciation of the second half of 1986.
The pattern of the price changes confirms that in 1983 
most prices had been closer to the parallel than to the 
official exchange rate. However, slightly over half of 1983s 
accelerated inflation reflected food price rises due mainly 
to the drought and the bulk of the subsequent fall in 
inflation reflected weather-related food price 
stabilization. Thus the positive real interest rates 
achieved in 1985 were lost in 1986 and the question of 
whether inflationary expectations have changed in a way that 
can eliminate inertial inflation remains open.
Money supply increases were low. Government bank 
borrowing requirements fell. Enterprise credit demand
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remained low and banks proved unwilling to expand credit to 
most of them. As a result banks began to refuse savings and 
time deposits creating a somewhat artificial stability (and 
presumably forcing velocity up, especially in 1983). Rather 
oddly it would appear that lower interest rates and/or less 
artifactual criteria for lending to enterprises would have 
increased monetized savings. They would also have tended to 
limit the tendency to transform money into non-perishable 
consumer goods and thus presumably modestly reduced 
inflation.
By the second half of 1986, the somewhat artificial 
liquidity problem had become acute. Banks were unable to 
extend enough credit or to mobilize enough currency for all 
viable enterprises to meet the conditions of the forex 
auction. The basic reason, now somewhat ironically, was the 
artificial curtailment of deposit (especially interest 
bearing deposit) levels which might be supposed to be 
counter-productive with enhanced loan demand from a growing 
number of firms with plausible cash flow and profit and loss 
positions.
GDP rose 7.6 per cent in 1984 and at least 5.3 per cent 
in 1985 - the first time per capita GDP had risen in two 
consecutive years since the 1960s. In 1986 it probably was 
above population growth (2.6 per cent) and possibly 4 per 
cent or better. This growth was fairly widely distributed 
sectorally albeit the high 1984 level relates in large part 
to weather related food crop harvest recovery.
Exports fell sharply from $641 million in 1982 to $439 
in 1983 partly on volume decline related to weather and 
continuing infrastructure deterioration and partly on price 
changes. The 1984 recovery to $566 million was dominated by 
favourable price changes but those of 1985 to $610 million 
and 1986 to $700 million did reflect substantial output 
increases offsetting some price weakening in cocoa albeit in 
1986 the gold price rose significantly.
Public services provision was badly hit by budgetary 
curtailment in 1983 as was public infrastructural 
investment. The ratio of budgetary spending to GDP fell to 
about 6.5 per cent (5.5 per cent recurrent and 1 per cent 
capital) and of revenue to 5.4 per cent. Further, the 
control method used of centralized, specific releases of 
funds for a wide range of items while effective in 
curtailing expenditure also curtails its efficiency.
The overemployment/underemployment problem has yet to be 
tackled squarely. The complementary resources available are 
at most adequate to justify half the present public service 
and Cocoa Board establishment - who on average are in fact 
working half time or less, a situation enforced by present 
pay levels. 1985-86 attempts to raise minimum wages 30 per 
cent, decompress after-tax differentials from 1 to 1.8 to 1 
to 5 and to rationalize/increase government (and reduce 
public enterprise) allowances within a 30 per cent pay-roll 
boost have created an impression of total confusion, a 
discrepancy in the Budget probably of the order of $100 
million and very considerable worker resentment.
In the most overstaffed parastatal, the Cocoa Board, 
employment at 89,000 to 110,000, depending on coverage, 
could sensibly be cut not by 16,000, as proposed and 
probably achieved, but to 16,000 or perhaps 25,000 including 
certain related activities. To do so is critical to raising 
the growers' share in export proceeds without creating 
fiscal havoc. But such cuts are possible only if replanting 
and field staff laid off can be allocated replanted or 
replantable areas and assisted in becoming cocoa (or other 
crop) farmers. It is by no means self-evident this could not 
be done but given the probable short-run political cost and 
the illusory nature of the Ministry of Agriculture's service 
delivery and programmatic capacity the chances of such an 
exercise are not high.
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The need to raise the Budget/GDP ratio is now recognized 
and indeed it has recovered to about 12 per cent (9 per cent 
recurrent, 3 per cent capital) on expenditure and 9 per cent 
on revenue side and rehabilitation programmes for education 
and health are at 'pledging conference' stage. 
Revenue-raising priorities, however, appear odd as well as 
raising problems for the access of poor people and 
vulnerable groups. While a number of low unit-value, high 
administrative cost fees are being introduced, sale and 
excise taxes with few exceptions remain derisory (1.5 per 
cent on schnapps, 0.5 per cent on soap as a proportion of 
retail price) partly at least because old specific rates 
have been raised rather than converted to ad valorem scales 
at plausible levels - with no apparent realization how 
derisory inflation had rendered their basic levels.
Fixed capital formation is now prioritized to 
rehabilitation and bottleneck breaking albeit some project 
priorities appear odd - e.g. a low traffic new highway from 
Accra to the Cote d'Ivoire border while the main north 
highway remains out. In this case EEC (and ECA) commitment 
to promoting regional cooperation clearly resulted in a 
spurious priority being given but Ghana should have 
developed and stuck to a systematic highway reconstruction 
and upgrading priority list. However, its absolute level 
appears dangerously low when compared to plausible 
depreciation estimates. Net fixed capital formation was 0.5 
per cent in 1982 on what was even then a rather low 
depreciation estimate. It has risen to 5.4 per cent in 1985 
largely because the depreciation rate has been halved - 
otherwise it would be 2 per cent (and on 
depreciation/capital stock procedures comparable to those 
used in a study of Zimbabwe it would be negative). The gross 
domestic savings rate remains low at perhaps 6 per cent in 
1985, and the net rate is probably negative.
3 3 .
34.
Joan Robinson once remarked that if one cast 
incantations (curses) on sheep and dusted their pastures 
with arsenic there would be a high correlation between 
incantations and sheep mortality. Given the brief period 
since stabilization and recovery began in Ghana the inverse 
problem of separating incantations (propriatory) and 
improved pasture arises.
1983 results were affected by the worst drought in 
Ghana's history and 1984 and 1985 by two years of above 
average rainfall. Import recovery via external resource 
transfers rising at gross level from $237 million in 1982 to 
$575 million in 1983, $514 million in 1984 and $674 million 
in 1985 clearly would have allowed increased output almost 
independent of particular policy choices. However, these 
funds could not have been secured except for the adoption 
and continuation of the Stabilization/Adjustment Programme. 
Given the 1966-83 (or as the external financial sources saw 
it 1957-83) record, the Ghana government had very limited 
credibility for bargaining on the parameters of the 
programme and given the chaotic and disintegrating state of 
the economy it also had little time to seek to negotiate 
alterations.
The extent of import increases can be overestimated. 
1981 levels (a desperate, unsustainable attempt of the dying 
Liman regime to hang on) have never been regained and much 
of the additional finance has gone to make 1982-83 levels 
sustainable, to reduce arrears or to service debt rather 
than to boost imports directly.
1982 imports of $631 million declined to $500 million in 
1983 before recovering to $616 million in 1984 and $727 
million in 1985. Even the 1984 and 1985 increases are higher 
at apparent than real level as some formerly smuggled 
imports have returned to 'no forex' and other official
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channels. Indeed imports are not projected to regain their 
official nominal price 1979-81 average of $925 million until 
1986-87. Therefore it is hard to argue that better overall 
economic management has been irrelevant to or insignificant 
in 1984-85 recovery.
While 1983-85 was marked by more centrally-allocated 
imports, the quality of allocation was very patchy. Key 
imports - e.g. steel for agricultural implements, the drug 
import counterpart of the approved health budget - have not 
been given priority while non-priority list amenity goods 
have been imported. Somewhat ironically the World Bank 
emerged as the champion of a tough, prioritized, centrally 
operated forex/import licence allocation system. It also - 
as a third best presumably - begun to stress the need for 
sectoral import support aid with uses tied to Ghana 
government stated priorities which have to date gone missing 
in the allocation process.
The 1986 auction system takes most enterprise sector 
import outside the allocation system which now applies only 
to government and a handful of general input (e.g. 
petroleum) imports. While there are some limits on approved 
uses, it is likely that, given profit margins and especially 
capital turnover periods, the new system will bias imports 
toward consumer goods and away from most manufacturing 
imports and capital goods (with vehicle spares and lorries 
probable exceptions).
However, the 1985 cocoa export recovery and the 1985-86 
crop purchases increase of over 40 per cent on the 1982/83 
low clearly owe much to the lagged results of 1982-85 cocoa 
price increases as does the reappearance of shea nuts as a 
'visible' export. The explosive recovery of timber exports 
from $12.3 million in 1982 to $30 million in 1985 and an 
estimated $60 million in 1986 was made possible by programme 
loans made under the programme combined with the price 
incentives given by devaluation and the same can be said of
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the halt in gold output decline albeit still at levels 10 
per cent below 1982 in 1985.
The defects (or disasters) of results in respect to 
basic services, investment and protection of vulnerable 
groups are equally not fully causally related to the 
programme. In the first place continuation of 1973-81 
non-policies or 1982's 'bootstrap' attempt would have 
produced worse results. In the second, there has been 
substantial and fairly prompt revision in respect to basic 
services albeit less evidently in relation to vulnerable 
groups or net investment levels.
However, the initial approach to the Budget of cutting 
expenditure rather than raising revenue was clearly unsound 
and the particular methods of cutting used probably reduced 
the effectiveness of expenditure.
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XIII. SELECTED PROBLEM AREAS
Cocoa is a central problem area in several senses. No 
reliable effective hectarage (excluding moribund areas and 
adjusting thin stands by some standard trees per hectare 
formula), yield per hectare, production, smuggling or 
replanting figures exist. The present policy and projections 
astoundingly treat output as identical to official 
purchases. As 1982 smuggling was probably in the 50,000 to
75.000 tonne range and the 157,000 to 225,000 tonne official 
purchase recovery over 1982/83-1985/86 may well be about 1/3 
weather, 1/3 clawed back smuggling and 1/3 higher production 
proper (from better care and/or greater availability or 
machetes, spray and sprayers) to elide output and official 
purchases seems unsound.
The lack of data on replanting makes output projections 
highly tentative.
A broader problem arises with 300,000 to 350,000 tonne 
targets. Over 1971-82 primary exports of cocoa fluctuated 
around a level of about 1,000,000 tonnes starting and ending 
at 1,184,000 and 1,187,000. Even including pre-export 
processed products (a growing share in most cocoa producers 
including Ghana), world demand growth at constant prices 
appear to be no higher than 2 per cent. With price 
elasticities of the order of .15 to .20 short term and .3 
medium to long, the implications of sharp production 
increases are only too clear. If Ghana raised exports from
150.000 to 300,000 tonnes this would boost global supply by 
10 per cent. Malaysia's explosive rise from 24,000 tonnes in 
1979 to over 100,000 today and a 1990 target of 200,000 
based on trees already planted adds another 7 per cent. If 
half of the Ghanaian increase was full clawback of smuggling 
the impact would be less severe, but on any view cocoa price 
prospects for the rest of the decade do not look promising.
Indeed, the prospects appear disastrous if one takes
Ghanaian (150,000), Malaysian (over 100,000), Ivoirienne 
(over 150,000), Nigerian (at least 50,000) and other 
producer (at least 50,000) 1985-90 output projections
seriously. These increases total over 500,000 tonnes (over
33 per cent) when the record suggests that over five years 
at most 100,000 tonnes (6.2/3 per cent) can be absorbed at 
constant real prices. At a -0.2 short term price elasticity, 
the price on the 26.1/3 per cent 'excess' supply increase 
would actually fall below zero. This is a far cry from the 
price increases hoped for by the Cote d'Ivoire or even the 
approximate stability posited by Ghana and the World Bank.
Clearly the elasticity would not remain constant over
that range nor would all the output rises materialize in the 
face of radical price falls. However, the International 
Cocoa agreement seems virtually certain to be unable to
defend its new (lowered) floor price for longer than 12 
months with a subsequent free fall quite likely until some 
output is squeezed out. Unfortunately Ghana's overall 
financial position is such that it can hardly expect to be 
able to sustain production (however economically efficient 
and however absent the export alternatives) if Malaysia, the 
Cote d'Ivoire, the Cameroon and Brazil decide to use interim 
subsidies to ensure the survival of their sectors at or near 
projected levels.
Rehabilitation and expansion of the cocoa processing 
plants (cocoa butter, powder and paste) probably merits more 
attention than it has received. The process adds substantial 
value added without increasing pressure on prices and if 
modernized/restored to full capacity the plants should at 
least break even.
Exports more broadly pose problems. To build a base for 
moderate growth - including capacity rehabilitation and 
utilization and investment in structural adjustment 
without exceptional finance requires a once for all doubling
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of exports and a subsequent 5 per cent a year growth path.
Over 90 per cent of exports come from timber and
products, gold, manganese, diamonds, cocoa and cocoa 
products with the last accounting for 25 per cent. Doubling 
the exports of the non-cocoa group over five to seven years 
and thereafter maintaining 5 per cent growth may be just 
feasible if logs are increasingly substituted for by sawn 
timber, plywood and veneer and manganese ore by ferro
manganese. Even with a massive increase in pre-export
processing it is very hard to see how the value of cocoa 
exports can be doubled, let alone kept growing 5 per cent a 
year thereafter.
Other exports (under 10 per cent) include shea nuts (a 
non-irritating oilseed with a growing specialty soap, baby 
oil and vegetable oil demand) and palm oil. In the case of 
the former - largely gathered not planted or tended 
agricultural changes are needed if supply is to rise; in 
that of the latter rapidly rising output is generating a 
surplus but at a breakeven fob price three times the
Malaysian crushed world price. Beyond that there are some 
pre-export processing opportunities (beyond timber, cocoa, 
manganese) exist, e.g. hides and skins, palm oil (to soap or 
margarine), gold (smelting and perhaps jewellery). 
Similarly, backward integration from electricity (the Valeo 
smelter) to bauxite/alumina may be viable for Ghana despite 
world excess capacity in bauxite mining and alumina 
processing.
Manufactured export potential - e.g. in textiles and 
garments if cotton production can be rebuilt - is 
problematic. It depends on finding specialty niches in the 
world market (e.g. specialty prints and garments) and 
reactivating ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African 
States sometimes unkindly called 'the Echo Was').
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Very little serious work, taxonomic or targeted, 
production or promotion oriented has been done beyond raw 
cocoa, logs and semi-refined gold. As these demonstrably 
cannot carry the load by themselves this would appear to be 
a serious gap. This gap is common to virtually all SSA 
Structural Adjustment Programmes, notably to those of Zambia 
and Tanzania.
One factor contributing to the lack of coherent, 
articulated export development strategies in SAP's is a 
belief that with right forex prices exports will follow. 
However, that is unlikely to be the whole explanation. The 
Bank has come to realize that adequate export recovery 
(measured in terms of earned import capacity) for SSA as a 
whole and for most individual countries cannot be achieved 
solely via existing primary product exports. It also 
recognizes that under actual projected market conditions 
diversification of any large SSA economy into the major 
exports of other SSA countries is likely to rob Peter to pay 
Paul (i.e. at continental level to suffer from the fallacy 
of composition). However, it has also lost faith in any 
early breakthroughs in manufactured exports (partly because 
despite the evidence of, e.g. Brazil and South Korea, it 
seems still to assume these must follow the dismantling of 
tight protectionism) and has an intuitive rather than 
reasoned distrust of pre-export processing. Thus the Bank 
and the Ghana government tend to concentrate on main 
existing exports' recovery or expansion even though they 
know that this is a partial and potentially a risky 
'solution'.
Agricultural policy, services, research and data outside 
cocoa are uneven and in general weak. No coherent strategy 
nor set of priority exists. Of the three stated priorities, 
one - cassava disease control - appears unnecessary, one - 
mechanized rice farming - highly undesirable, one - maize - 
useful but arguably less urgent than millet, guinea corn and 
yams which are crucial to food security and cash income in
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the Northern and Upper Regions which are starved for both.
Input supply (especially hand tools, cocoa sprayers and 
spray and improved seed) requires strengthening. Transport 
rehabilitation requires main highway reconstruction 
(especially Kumasi-Manpong-Ejura-Tamale) as much as feeder 
road and track building (much of which can be, and an 
increasing volume of which is being, done on a community 
basis). A coherent research and extension programme linked 
both to adaptation and testing and to learning from farmers 
is needed. Data is at present inconsistent and incoherent, 
anarchic non-communication and immobility appears a greater 
problem than overcentralization, e.g. the one functioning 
regional programme Voradep (Volta) is not only nearly 
independent of the Ministry but much of its work is not 
consciously known there much less to other regions.
If rural income raising - especially of poor farmers - 
is a serious goal it needs to be integrated into policy. The 
crop priorities (beyond cocoa and palm oil) would appear to 
be guinea corn (sorghum), millet, small scale labour 
intensive rice, cocoyams, yams, plantains, groundnuts, 
cotton, tobacco, coconut (if varieties resistant to Cape St. 
Paul wilt can be bred) and shea nut (developing farming - as 
opposed to gathering - techniques).
For most farmers, the main cash crop is a food crop (a 
fortiori for most women farmers and most poor farmers). In 
the Northern and Upper Region the paradox of a food trade 
surplus (yams, groundnuts and grain to the South and 
Burkina, cattle to the South) and the worst nutritional 
levels in Ghana has two explanations. The only way to meet 
cash needs is to sell food even if initial production levels 
were already inadequate to meet household needs. And the 
collapse, from depressed controlled prices, of cotton and 
tobacco which were moderately complementary in production 
with staple foods and provided alternate cash income sources 
has increased pressures to sell food. The 1985-86 transfer
cotton procurement to an oil milling/cloth producing 
consortium and of tobacco procuring to the cigarette company 
should have a positive impact in this context. Facing high 
import costs for inputs or lack of licenses and unsatisfied 
local demand together with substantial unused capacity, 
these users do have a medium term incentive to raise the 
grower price and certainly to get out and buy. The evident 
need to safeguard growers against their oligopsonistic 
interests in holding grower prices down is a medium to long 
term future, not a present one.
Labour and wages pose a set of interlocking problems 
with which the PNDC has been grappling with decreasing 
success. Despite the fact that real wages and real cocoa 
prices have risen, the combination of trade union militancy 
for an early return at least to 1977 and a highly accident 
prone 1985-86 set of contradictory initiatives by the 
Ministry of Finance have created serious government/trade 
union precedents. Given the TUC1s role as government 
underminer these have to be taken seriously.
Real wages are too low to be efficient. Nobody can 
afford to give a full day's work because nobody receives a 
full day's pay. Like farmers, wage earners do respond to 
incentives, not least to negative ones.
Too high a proportion of wage and salary income are 
allowances and these are fragmented, unequal and peculiar. 
There is, inter alia, a near total loss of transparency, a 
systematic underpaying of the government sector and a 
serious erosion of the tax base.
Government differentials after income tax of 1 to 1.8 as 
of 1985 were far too low to provide incentives or to retain 
adequate skilled, artisanal and professional cadres. Given 
the falling private sector employment the exit options were 
abroad and into informal self-employment. This has also 
distorted career choices as illustrated by two examples. A
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driver still is proud that his son is about to win his way 
to university and hopes he will become a lecturer. A 
lecturer tells his son not to bother with forms five and 
six, let alone university, but to become a self employed 
electrician via informal apprenticeship and learning on the 
job.
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There is no way all government employees can be paid a 
living wage and provided with adequate supporting inputs 
(e.g. mobility, tools, working materials whether pump 
spares, seeds, texts or typewriters with paper) in the 
foreseeable future. The Cocoa Board is the epitome of this 
with 'employment' comparable to the entire private 
enterprise sector.
Over 1985/86 the government announced:
a. a 50 per cent minimum wage increase;
b. a widening of the government differential to one to 
five;
c. reduction of parastatal allowances to government sale;
d. initiation, cancellation and - in the face of an outcry 
- restoration of a government service annual home leave 
allowance of 20 per cent of base pay;
e. ending parastatal operating subsidies by 1987 with 
higher charges or lower employment to close the gap (which 
led inter alia to 500 to 600 per cent postal rate increases 
from ludricous to plausible level spearheaded by workers' 
committees when the management showed no sign of knowing how 
to increase receipts!);
f. cutting (apparently marginally and in unspecified ways 
with promised but unspecified 'redeployment') or government 
and Cocoa Board employment beyond cuts already achieved by
dropping 'ghosts' from the payroll;
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g. holding the government employment bill growth in 1986 to 
30 per cent.
As is - or ought to be - self evident the Budget target 
is not consistent with the pay and allowance changes - 
possibly by as much as cedi 8-9 billion ($90-100 million at 
that time). Further, the threatened cuts in public 
enterprise allowances, the spectre of large scale 
redundancies and the too-ing and fro-ing on the (patently 
ill thought out) leave allowance, have alienated workers, 
ignored specific case by case realities and created an aura 
of indecision and incoherence (intriguingly more in respect 
of Finance than of Labour). What they have not done is 
provide a strategy for resolving any of the major formal 
employment sector conundrums.
Budget strategy and management increasingly appear to be 
problematic areas rather than pillars of strength. The 
initial reduction of government spending is now perceived as 
an error and has been reversed but its costs in nearly 
destroying government health services and gravely 
undermining education, transport and works and agriculture 
remain.
Expenditure control is effective at keeping within 
estimates primarily by releasing most items included in the 
Budget only on a case by case, need proven, funds available, 
cleared at top Treasury level basis. Unfortunately this also 
tends to slow down and in part paralyse an already weak and 
slow moving government system.
Revenue base reform has been real but uneven. The 
continued dependence on cocoa export taxes (Cocoa Board 
surpluses) hardly helps restore incentives to growers. It 
results from very low effective indirect taxes on local 
products other than beer, cigarettes and petroleum products.
In large part this relates to continued use of archaic 
specific rates, e.g. a tripling of the excise on schnapps 
(the basic spirit) in 1986 raised it to 1.5 per cent of the 
retail price while on soap a 60 per cent boost took it to
0.5 per cent. The old exemption of exciseable goods from the 
'general' 10 per cent sales tax on ex-factory price was made 
because the excise was then higher, now it protects a highly 
preferential, revenue eroding set of rates.
Reform of indirect taxes and consolidating allowances 
with wages and salaries for income tax purposes would yield 
more revenue at less cost than recent attempts to collect 
fees on millions of small charge transactions. On purely 
administrative efficiency grounds several - e.g. monthly 
standpipe user household water charges, fees for oral 
rehydration salts - appear to be nightmares likely to open 
new avenues of corruption and strain on already overburdened 
and lagging accounting systems (as the designated collection 
agencies who were not consulted in advance agree) quite 
apart from the fact that similar revenue from taxing 
consumer manufactures in general and alcohol in particular 
would seem to have distinct equity advantages.
Basic services - health, education, water - are now 
receiving attention with at least some priority to basic 
sub-sectors (e.g. immunisation and primary health care, 
primary and skills education, rural water). However, to fund 
these solely out of incremental resources without major tax 
reform will prove a slow process. In health, closing 
derelict hospitals and redeploying their staff and resources 
could achieve more rapid results. Similarly, substitution 
for most of the new fees of community or neighbourhood cost 
sharing (e.g. in food, labour, materials, maintenance, 
communal collection of pump servicing fees to be paid 
when/if serviced) could probably further participation, 
reduce access problems for poor people and raise more 
resources than individual fees at basic services level. 
Similarly, higher piped water charges to cross-subsidize
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standpipes would appear administratively, financially and 
equitably superior to standpipe user charges.
More generally the poor and the vulnerable while clearly 
of concern to the PNDC at higher levels albeit perhaps less 
so to the Ministry of Finance are not the beneficiaries of 
specific, targetted programme attention. Raising 
agricultural production in poor areas, assisting (by credit 
or technical assistance) informal sector production, food 
security, etc., have not been seriously addressed. Indeed, 
as noted, actural agricultural policy is biased against poor 
regions and farmers while the fee emphasis in fiscal policy 
seems likely to reduce their access to basic services in 
contrast to alternative financing routes.
This is emphatically not to argue that the decline in 
basic service access and rise in absolute poverty are the 
result of the stabilization and adjustment programme. For 
that the primary blame must rest on 1966-81 economic policy 
and especially on 1972-81 non-policy, and secondary on 
1974-75 and 1979-81 external shock with the 1981-83 drought 
cycle responsible for their post 1981 crisis. Poor people in 
Ghana would certainly not have been better off had the 
1979-81 drift continued nor had the PNDC refused to 
negotiate a stabilization/adjustment programme acceptable to 
the Fund and back and persevered in a purely bootstrap 
approach.
Nor it is self evident that the programme itself has 
harmed them. What is evident is that - quite needlessly - 
practicable vulnerable group and poor person protection 
targets in respect to health and education access, nutrition 
and agricultural production possibilities were not built 
into the programme in 1983 or 1984 and only very partially 
since. Even in short term economic and incentive and 
production terms this was, and is, probably shortsighted. In 
the medium term it will be a drag both on economic recovery 
and on social and political stability. The fault cannot be
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laid solely at the door of the Fund, the Bank and the 
bilaterals. The Bank and some of the bilaterals, indeed, 
seem to have spotted some of the gaps and possible ways to 
overcome them rather more quickly than some Ghanaian 
Ministries (e.g. Agriculture and Finance).
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XIV. PROSPECTS: ADJUSTMENT FATIGUE, EXPECTATIONS,
IMPORTS
48.
Ghana is suffering from adjustment fatigue. The 
exhileration of the 1984 initial recovery appears to be 
wearing off, the expectation of high short term gains 
(especially by wage employees) is rising and the ability of 
the government to avoid damaging conflicts or cave-ins (as 
exemplified by the confused noises on public sector 
allowances, the unclosed budgetary data and the astounding 
mid-1986 assertion - apparently intended for donor ears only 
- that the economy was dead in the water apparently leading 
to the forex auction as a face saving device) is waning.
At the same time most Ghanaians are better off than in 
1981 - let alone 1983 - and so perceive themselves. In rural 
areas there is a dynamic of community
organization/mobilization which is having a not 
insignificant impact on public service provision and which 
implies that incomes of many are above subsistence levels.
Continuation of 5 to 6 per cent growth - with rising 
rates of government recurrent spending and of domestic 
savings to GDP and a 3 per cent population increase - will 
not allow much growth in real per capita consumption. While 
radically better than the 1972-82 trend a growth of per 
capita real consumption of 1 per cent or less a year may not 
be consistent with social stability.
But even a 5 per cent to 6 per cent medium term growth 
rate is far from assured. It depends on no new drought cycle 
beginning before 1989, on a total break with the 1960-82 
food production trend and on no or minor net terms of trade 
losses. Even if one accepts that each has a .6 probability 
that implies .36 probability of meeting both tests. In 1986 
it is unlikely that 5 per cent was achieved even though 
there was no drought and petroleum price gains more than 
offset cocoa price losses.
Similarly, the requisite external resource transfer and 
export earnings levels are by no means assured. For 1987 and 
1988 over 25 per cent of the gross resource transfers cannot 
be identified unless one assumes 100 per cent redrawing of 
IMF repayments. While export quantity projections may be 
attainable despite averaging 16 per cent a year if gold and 
timber recovery can be prevented from sliding further behind 
schedule and more smuggled cocoa can be clawed back into 
visibility, the value figures are highly doubtful (barring a 
gold price boom). Cocoa prices fell in 1985, are falling in 
1986 and can be expected to fall further - especially if 
Ghana production rises significantly. In 1986 an export 
value shortfall is likely to be clawed back by the fall in 
oil prices (one country's supply shock is another's windfall 
gain) but the prospects for such deii ex machinae in 1987 
and 1988 do not look too promising.
These problems are compounded by distribution issues. 
For productivity as well as human conditions reasons, 
rehabilitation of health (primary health care) and of 
education as well as creation of relevant agricultural 
services are a priority. This will require tax reform - 
especially through raising indirect taxes. Labour, 
especially in the public sector is paid at rates below those 
necessary for efficiency of labour peace and while 
retrenching 30 to 50 per cent of the government and Cocoa 
Board employees and paying the same total wages/salaries 
might well raise public sector output, it would hardly be 
conductive to social stability or to avoiding labour unrest 
seriously damaging to productivity an to expectations unless 
very substantial self employment at plausible income levels 
can be generated by targetted, funded government backed 
programmes which do not now exist even at conceptual level. 
Further there is a growing awareness that the Northern and 
Upper Regions are very much poorer and have participated 
much less in 1983-85 recovery than other Ghanaians and a 
similar awareness in respect to the urban poor. These 
concerns are shared by the PNDC government and most of its
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members wish to be able to act on them before 1989. To do so 
will require reallocation (by direct state, managed market 
or investment pattern alteration instruments) in a context 
in which the room for cuts to other social actors is less 
than apparent.
Especially given the 1985-86 shifts toward 
rehabilitating basic services for human, social, 
productivity and longer-term development reasons the Ghana 
programme to date is a qualified but also a considerable 
success. Certainly it has achieved stabilization and the 
first steps toward recovery and, less clearly, sustainable 
structural adjustment. But its own sustainability remains 
far from assured and its long-term adequacy is open to 
doubt.
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XV. SOME INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
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The Ghana programme raises several questions about Fund 
Stabilization/Bank Structural Adjustment Programme strategy 
and policy. These appear to be relevant to most major 
Fund/Bank efforts in SSA.
The IMF appears to be lending short-term 8 per cent 
money to finance either conversion or arrears into IMF 
drawings or to provide import support in contexts in which 
no plausible external balance projections suggest it can be 
repaid except through immediate redrawing.
This may give the IMF leverage, but at the cost of 
providing inappropriate programme finance, of leaving the 
borrowers without first line liquidity if (when) a short 
term shock hits the programme and of using IMF resources for 
purposes arguably outside its remit.
The IMF appears to be in two minds on this issue. It 
certainly does officially and presumably sincerely regret 
being locked in to large, long-term lending to a series of 
SSA economies. On the other hand in some new programmes, 
e.g. Tanzania 1986, it has apparently pressed for larger IMF 
drawings than the country wanted and in at least one case, 
that of Zimbabwe in 1986, it has pressed a state to redraw 
when it wished, and seemed able, to repurchase (repay) all 
drawings on schedule to restore its first line liquidity 
base .
So long as the structural adjustment programmes of the 
World Bank are in fact as well as in name (i.e. for major 
consultative groups backed by large Bank sectoral lending as 
well as for formally titled SAL's) linked to higher 
credit-tranche agreements with the Fund the foregoing 
problem has major potential implications. At the worst they 
are that overuse of shorter-term, higher-cost, inappropriate 
external credit is a precondition to access to longer-term,
lower-cost, more appropriate finance! The Nigerian 1986 
route of negotiating what amounts to a higher credit tranche 
agreement with the Fund but then borrowing from the Bank 
(and the much smaller 1984 Rwandaise programme where IDA 
credits have in effect been substituted for Fund drawings) 
may be a way forward but one constrained domestically by the 
apparent cost of IMF agreements which yield no funds and 
externally by limits on Bank resources.
In Ghana high use of IMF drawings may have been 
unavoidable. 1983s external finance was dominantly Bank and 
Fund - most of the bilaterals hung back to await results. 
However, the probable price to Fund and Ghana alike is high; 
they are mutually locked in for the foreseeable future.
The World Bank in Ghana - as elsewhere in SSA - has not 
been able to achieve pledges equal to its own estimates of 
minimum levels needed for programme success. This is not for 
lack of using as much as possible of its own resources but 
rather results from failing to convince donors that resource 
flows at the beginning of a programme are crucial - waiting 
to see what happens may well ensure failure whatever the 
country does. Similarly, Bank success at convincing donors 
to simplify disbursement channels and agree to nationally 
set precedures to reduce the commitment/disbursement lag is 
to date distinctly limited.
Ghana faces debt service ratios (excluding supplementary 
borrowing) of over 65 per cent to the early or mid-1990s as 
a result of heavy use of IMF and of medium term export 
credits (both also relatively high cost) as a result of 
inadequate availability of longer term, lower cost funding. 
Equally it continues to face very serious lags on 
disbursements. Indeed the latter were the apparent cause of 
the Secretary for Finance's externally directed July 1986 
bombshell statement that the economy was dead in the water 
and the whole structural adjustment exercise in danger. 
While leading to an emergency development assistance
(donors) group consultation that statement had major 
negative repercussions on domestic confidence and seems to 
have led to the forex auction system being launched more to 
show dramatically that the Treasury was still able to 
influence events than because of any very evident analytical 
case or because of external pressure.
Both the Fund and the Bank appear to have been unduly 
optimistic about the speed of export recovery (another 
endemic characteristic of SSA programmes). Neither seems to 
have re-run world cocoa price projections to see what
150,000 tonnes extra Ghana output would do to prices. Export 
revenue projections appear to be based on global price 
projections excluding the proposed additional Ghanaian 
output.
More generally, as noted above, no articulated, overall, 
medium term strategy for raising export levels to meet 
minimum import requirements without (supposedly transitory) 
structural adjustment aid and to adjust their structure to 
reduce risk and to increase buoyancy has been developed.
Despite the Bank's own use of restoring 1980 per capita 
real import levels as a rule-of-thumb, medium-term recovery 
target, the only SSA structural adjustment programme to be 
formally centred on meeting the articulated import 
requirements of stabilization and recovery is the 1986 
Tanzania programme and there the choice of formulation was 
the borrower's, not the Bank's. The Ghana programme does not 
include specific sectoral import requirement estimates for 
targetted output levels and, therefore, is not presented as 
an exercise in financing them by combination of resource 
transfers and export growth.
Other assumptions also look optimistic, notably that 
there will be no drought before 1990. The problem is not 
that any one assumption is hopelessly optimistic- except for 
the cocoa price overestimate and export response lag
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underestimate. The difficulty is that if each of six 
assumptions has an 0.6 probability the likelihood of all six 
being on target at the same time is under 5 per cent.
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This over-optimism is particularly dangerous when 
programme are underfinanced to start with and heavy use of 
IMF drawings has left no first line liquidity source 
available. In the event of a shock there are no safe margins 
for cutback nor any emergency, interim resources on which to 
draw.
Both the Fund (which admittedly makes no claims to 
expertize in this field) and the Bank (which does) appear to 
have suffered from tunnel vision. Basic needs, food security 
and basic services were initially overlooked - albeit as 
noted the Bank became alert to this damaging narrowness 
before some key Ghanaian ministries and the Fund has at 
least verbally accepted that many existing stabilization 
programmes may pay inadequate attention to such issues.
The Bank and the Fund both accepted that import 
increases not decreased were necessary for stabilization, 
let alone structural adjustment in Ghana and, with a lag, 
accepted the same proposition in respect to real government 
revenue and expenditure.
While posing the question of living wages versus 
sustained over-staffing in the public sector, the Bank 
arguably has not pressed Ghana hard enough to reach a 
coherent strategic decision and a scenario for implementing 
it. This seems particularly true in respect to Cocoa Board.
XVI. TOWARD STRUCTURAL IMPROVEMENT OF ADJUSTMENT
PROGRAMMES
The balance of responsibility for overcoming the 
shortcomings identified varies from case to case. However, 
it is usually shared. For example, the World Bank should 
take a lead in supporting African proposals for a 
multi-country debtor/creditor dialogue to identify 
guidelines for regaining managability of SSA's external 
debt. But the African states should make rather more 
concrete proposals as to criteria for satisfactory 
reschedulings/partial writeoffs (or alternative expansion of 
soft, long term import support as a de facto writeoff route) 
and be willing to consider whether uniform criteria for,
e.g. the Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria on the one hand and, e.g. 
Ghana, Tanzania, the Sudan, Mozambique and Zambia on the 
other, are either attainable or desirable. Similarly, the 
basic responsibility for avoiding muddles such as Ghana's 
1985-86 wage, allowance and tax changes and the very unwise 
attempt to shock donors by describing the economy as dead in 
the water is surely Ghanaian. But, had donors funded the 
1983-86 programmes at the levels the World Bank thought 
prudent and accepted the need (posed by the Bank as well as 
by Ghana) to speed up disbursements, the Ghanaian Secretary 
of Finance would have had more room for manoeuvre ('as much 
space as possible' in his words) and with less pressure to 
square the circle might well have avoided the miscues.
In respect to achieving minimum prudent levels of
financing and debt service relief and a prudent mix of
grant, soft and quasi commercial funding with a manageable 
payments profile, the Bank and Fund need to play the leading 
role (including Fund reconsideration of the appropriateness 
of higher credit tranche drawings for structural adjustments 
likely to last ten years) as they have more potential for
convincing external financial sources than do SSA structural
adjustment candidates - including Ghana.
In respect to exports the responsibility is 
country/Bank. Logically the prime role should be taken by
the country but given the weakness of country expertise re 
new exports, not least in Ghana, and the weight of the
Bank's past over-emphasis on existing primary exports and 
present apparent over-optimism on relative price shifts 
fairly rapidly and automatically resulting in substantial 
export breakthroughs, a parallel Bank intellectual and 
technical assistance lead is needed. Both should realize 
that what can be done is likely to be highly country
specific.
Fiscal policy and practice should be an area of 
governmental initiative with Bank supporting technical 
inputs if necessary. There are some applicable general
principles and policies but most programmes come unstuck on 
details, often context specific ones. However, the Bank 
needs to continue its new pragmatism on whether (and when) 
revenue increases are more appropriate than expenditure cuts 
- the new line sharply illustrated by its switch in respect 
to Ghana. It should also integrate its support for basic 
services more clearly into its fiscal priorities (as should 
the Government of Ghana) and rethink when, what types of 
service fees are either equitable or cost effective revenue 
raising devices.
Government leadership on achieving coherent, 
comprehensive, articulated agricultural sector strategies 
and goals is urgently needed. Few SSA economies - least of 
all Ghana - can seriously claim to have them now. In light 
of the evidence that overall only 10 per cent of output 
growth variations in SSA are explained by real grower price 
trends (probably rather more - perhaps 25 per cent - in 
Ghana), more weight - absolutely and relative to price 
manipulation - is needed to identify and to act on the other 
90 per cent of causation (by the Bank as well as the 
majority of SSA governments in danger of learning that 'if 
only we get the prices right all else will follow' precisely
• *
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as it is being demonstrated to be inadequate). While the 
Bank can hardly operate shadow agricultural strategy 
exercises for every SSA structural adjustment candidate, it 
does need to strengthen its staff in this area or to deploy 
them on a more prioritized basis. In the Ghana case - the 
showcase structural adjustment programme in SSA - no 
in-depth, high level Bank agricultural mission, other than 
for cocoa, appeared until 1986 in the third year of the 
programme despite the known (to Ghana and the Bank) weakness 
of the Ministry and the record of twenty-five years of 
inadequate food output trend growth.
Because agricultural research is long term, has 
economies of scale and coordination and is prominent in the 
work of only one sub-regional coordination grouping in 
Africa (SSA) the Bank should play a catalytic and funding 
role in restructuring and strengthening it. In Ghana it has 
certainly not meddled on inadequate knowledge but nor has it 
proposed a feasible, prioritized approach. Unless and until 
research breakthroughs are achieved SSA's agricultural 
growth trend will remain precarious (Ghana is no exception). 
Restoring infrastructure, inputs, basic services and 
creating effective extension of what is known could buy five 
to ten years of 3 to 4 per cent average annual agricultural 
growth in SSA. But it is vital the time bought be used to 
create a knowledge base to shift the underlying trend, a 
priority only too easy for a single country facing difficult 
resource constraints and choices to overlook or defer too 
long.
In respect to proper prioritization for and design of 
basic services the political will needs to come from the 
governments (as it does from the PNDC) and be articulated to 
inform actual resource allocation priorities drawn up 
between ministerial and treasury professionals (as it 
arguably does not in Ghana). The Bank is not intellectually 
a leader in this field but it does have a - somewhat outside 
its own mainstream - commitment to such services on
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production, fabric of society (and consent) maintenance and 
equity grounds which should not simply be encouraged but 
integrated into its overall approach to structural 
adjustment. Bringing it in two years after the programme 
starts, on a semi-integrated basis and with a fascination 
for user charge financing whatever its technical, fiscal or 
equity limitations is not good enough.
Income distribution (social actor participation in gains 
and costs) whether based on equity, social stability, human 
welfare or/and production grounds is not an area in which 
external actors can usually shift a governing coalitions 
strategy more than marginally. Trying to do so may, in fact, 
produce worse results than accepting that only marginal 
changes will be acceptable because of new measures to offset 
what the external actors thought had been 'agreed' in an 
explicit policy change package or because attempts to 
enforce the 'agreed' (read imposed) measures rend the fabric 
of society (Sudan 1985, Zambia 1986 explosions over price 
increases or freeing excluding wages from the prices
increased or freed). Neither result is likely to be
economically efficient and the latter is particularly likely 
to have negative output and government authority/credibility 
costs. What the Bank and Fund should do is to seek to 
understand what government's real income distribution goals 
and motivations are; to look at policies designed to further
them with an initially open mind (e.g. Zimbabwe's phasing
out food subsidies and in parallel boosting the minimum and 
other low wages to compensate that group of poor people) and 
to suggest more cost efficient ways of furthering the stated 
ends when existing instruments are too costly or 
inefficient. This should work two ways, i.e. states pursuing 
massively and increasingly unequal income distribution for 
whatever reasons and using high cost measures which increase 
the numbers in absolute poverty (arguably Malawi, Zaire and 
to a lesser degree Kenya are examples) need to be advised 
just as fully as ones pursuing fuzzy and impracticable 
populism or welfarism, such as, arguably, pre-1983 Ghana and
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Zambia. At present only the latter seem to be admonished 
with much energy or any warning that lack of change might 
put funds at risk.
One area in which more government initiative - and 
greater Fund, Bank, donor acceptance thereof - is needed is 
overall programme strategy and parameter design. The Bank 
(and occasionally the Fund) in SSA programmes usually does 
allow the government to do the actual detailed formulation 
but only on an agenda of the Bank's choosing. This is not 
necessarily primarily the Bank's fault in all cases. Many 
SSA governments have been notably lacking in putting up 
serious alternative agendae and working drawings toward 
programme blueprints. In cases in which they have, such as 
Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Nigeria, the final agreements do appear 
to be noticeably different from the standard package. States 
have often not done their homework; Ghana's 1982 strategy, 
however laudable in vision, was not practicable and, when 
that became clear to the PNDC, it had no alternative other 
than to turn to the Fund and Bank and no time left to seek 
to draw one up. But the Bank appears to be too paternalistic 
or too prone to see itself as a Platonic Guardian guiding 
low rank 'Warriors' (in Plato's class structure) - in its 
approach to SSA proposals and counter-proposals.
All of these issues or lessons do arise from Ghanaian
1983-86 experience. All appear to have more general 
relevance to low (and lower-middle) income Sub-Saharan 
Africa and probably to small and medium-sized low and lower 
middle income economies in Asia, the Pacific, the Caribbean 
and Latin America as well. A few more rules of thumb may 
also be generalisable from Ghanaian experience - as swiftly 
compared with that elsewhere in SSA.
First, avoid gimmicks and especially the belief that 
they are nostrums which will eradicate basic structural 
problems rapidly and painlessly. 'No foreign exhange' (i.e.
external income, asset or, more probably, smuggling proceed
f
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financed) import licenses and forex auctions are among the 
glaring examples. In SSA the former may be relatively 
innocuous, but also useless, or a very effective incentive 
to outward smuggling with Ghana illustrating the former and 
Tanzania the latter end of the spectrum. Forex auctions may 
be marginally useful if sensibly managed, but do not obviate 
the need to have priorities beyond buyer financial resources 
for allocating imports nor that to take a view on 
appropriate forex price levels and trends. They may help 
depoliticise exchange rate (foreign currency price) changes 
but are not the only method and may well fail to do so if 
they appear to drive up the auction and parallel market 
rates dramatically and at rates well in excess of inflation. 
Why frequent, small, technically (e.g. Treasury, Central 
Bank) determined changes would not be superior in most 
contexts (and a panacea in none) is not at all self evident.
Second, assume ten years for structural adjustment of a 
badly debilitated economy (e.g. Ghana, Tanzania, Zaire; ten 
years after peace in Sudan, Chad, Mozambique, Uganda) and 
five years for a less severely impacted one (e.g. Zimbabwe). 
Attempting to 'prove' a shorter period is adequate by 
juggling projections and assumptions can be very costly. 
Even with absolutely objective analysis complications, side 
effects and lags on average tend to be underestimated. If 
results come faster than expected then the costs of that 
'mistake' are low.
Third, make real import requirement and, therefore, 
export and external financing requirements for ten years and 
build articulated targets (and plausible means to achieving 
them) into the core of the programme.
Fourth, avoid underfunding, or funding scrabbled 
together on too costly terms and with too early a repayment 
profile, and above all avoid 'reconciling' funding gaps by 
marking down levels needed thereby destroying the 
feasibility and consistency of the whole programme.
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Fifth, recognize that too optimistic goals (which are 
then not met) and repeated chopping and changing of policy 
have high credibility and consent costs both externally and, 
a fortiori, domestically. This is probably especially true 
when they follow a period of incoherent policies and 
sustained economic unsuccess and are nearly certain to be 
read as a continuation of, or return to, that record. This 
cannot mean avoidance of changes when the existing targets 
or policies are clearly unsustainable but precisely for that 
reason it is a counsel for care in pre-adoption projection 
and policy/parameter design work.
But generalization from the Ghanaian experience also has 
severe limitations even in low income SSA. A country with a 
less anarchic economy, a more coherent economic strategy and 
a firmer political base may well not need (nor be willing to 
accept) as violent an initial shock as Ghana in 1983 and may 
have far more seriously articulated and, arguably, 
practicable strategic parameters and policies to 
counter-propose than Ghana did. These are strengths for the 
country and its people if and only if the Fund, the Bank and 
donors/lenders as well as the government see them as assets 
but wasting assets and do not embark on interminable 
negotiations while the situation worsens (e.g. the Tanzanian 
case over 1981-86 in which, while relative to 1981 external 
proposals the actual 1986 agreement is much better, the cost 
in economic weakening over the period has been very high). 
Per contra, a government with a similar economic position 
but a much lower domestic credibility, or a stronger 
internal political opposition, probably could not survive 
adopting and enforcing a programme as stringent as Ghana's. 
The importance in this respect as well as in focusing 
systematic attention on economic policy choices (even if 
some of the initial ones were not viable) of the PNDC1s 1982 
actions appears to be a potentially generalisable point from 
the Ghana experience which has been widely overlooked.
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Perhaps one final generalization is in order. Ghana's 
structural adjustment is the longest continuously running 
(completing four years in March 1987), externally backed one 
in SSA. It has had full governmental and very substantial 
Bank support. In many if not all respects, it has been 
conceptually sound and energetically implemented. It has 
also been lucky (e.g. drought to good weather, oil price 
fall, relatively good export price performance at least 
until the second half of 1986). But it is still fragile, 
intensely vulnerable to domestic and external shocks and 
unable to be even relatively assured of meeting basic 
targets even in a year of relatively favourable weather and 
external price conditions (e.g. 1986s missed growth,
inflation, soft aid, visible and non-factor trade balance
targets). Neither GFCF nor real imports have been restored 
to levels consistent with stable, long-term growth. 
Realistic projections suggest at least six more years of 
large (probably larger) special soft resource injections 
will be needed if Ghana is to be able to return to 'normal' 
net external financing requirements consistent with 4 per 
cent or higher average GDP growth (the minimum for any
serious attention to employment, food security, absolute 
poverty or basic needs). There is no reason to suppose that 
initial problems, payoffs and prospects will be better in 
more than a handful (e.g. Zimbabwe) of SSA's 25 odd
structural adjustment candidates and good reason to expect 
them to be poorer and more intractable in several (e.g.
Burkina, Chad, Mozambique, Sudan, Uganda, Zaire). Since, 
barring the discovery of fairies with crocks of gold payable 
to SSA economies at the end of two bakers' dozen rainbows, 
these countries need structural adjustment for their and 
their people's sakes (whatever outsiders do or do not 
advocate) this is not a counsel not to try but a warning of 
how costly, hard and lengthy the road is likely to be even 
when, as in Ghana, some clear gains are won fairly promptly.
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Annex
Population And Per Capita Trends
Ghana population data for most years since 1970 are open to grave doubt. The
1970 and 1984 Census results may well be reasonably accurate but the
interpolations between them, the underlying population growth trend and the 
probable future resident population trend are problematic.
The 1984 Census figure of 12,20,000 shows a raw growth rate of 2.6Í a year
from 1970s Census outturn of 8,559,000. However, several problems arise:
a. population growth has been estimated at 3Í to 3-25Í excluding net 
immigration/emigration;
b. pre- 1 9 8 3  estimates of Ghanaians abroad in West Africa were as high as
2,000,000 (UNICEF) and up to 250,000 were probably elsewhere in Africa 
and in Europe - North America - Middle East. That would be roughly 
consistent with 3% to 3-25Í underlying population growth;
c. after 1970 some non-Ghanaians may have left Ghana (net) albeit the major 
expulsions came in 19 6 9;
d. over 1973-75 and even more 1979-82 large numbers of Ghanaians (of all 
social classes and education levels) flocked to jobs in faster growing 
economies, especially Nigeria (reversing the pre-1965 pattern);
e. in 1983 1,000,000 (quasi official Ghanaian figure) or 500,000 (private 
and some quasi private official estimates) Ghanaians were repatriated by 
Nigeria but a substantial number seeped back with 150,000-200,000 
reportedly re-repatriated in 1985;
f. the most recent government data show about 2.6Í increase 1 9 8 0 -8 3
(allowing no room for any repatriation), under 2% 1983-84; over 4$
1984-85; slightly over 3Í 1985-86 which correspond neither with Central 
Bureau of Statistics figures (which are close to straight 2.6* 
interpolations) nor with any coherent adjustment for a -say - 3Í
- f a -
underlying rate plus (minus) net emigration (representation).
This set of uncomfortable facts strongly suggests that 1970-82 GDP and food 
availability per capita falls are overstated. By the same token 1982—1983 
falls are understated quite significantly even if net returnees were only
500,000. 198*1 and subsequent year estimates may be about right (assuming net
repatriation of 100-125,000 in 1985).
Thus any per capita trend data for periods running beyond 1970 but ending 
before 19 8 3 are open to doubt as are any projections assuming 2.6Í population 
growth since substantial net out-migration is unlikely to be possible in the 
short or medium term with both Nigeria and the Cote d'Ivoire depreseed and 
cracking down on "foreign Africans" and somewhat similar conditions (at least 
so far as Ghanaian residence and job access go) pertaining in Western Europe.
Annual agricultural production data are so weak, contradictory and generally 
implausible as to make any attempt to check 1983—1985 returnee estimates by 
198*4-1986 food crop output nearly useless. The high 1 9 8 3/8*1 increase could be 
weather alone or to include a misallocation of cassava between 1983 and 198*1; 
the 1 9 8*1 / 8 5 purported decline appears to result from an underweighting and 
underestimation of root crops (a decrease in output and very slow post crop 
food price increases are hard to reconcile); 1 9 8 5 / 8 6 tentative *1.5% growth of 
food output looks plausible even without assuming substantial 1985 net 
repatriation.
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ANNEX - TABLE 1
AVERAGE GROWTH RATES KEY INDICATORS: 1965-83 
(per cent)
Item 1965-73 1973-83
1. Population3 2.2 3.1
2. Domestic production3
(a) GDP 3.4 -1.3
(b) GDP per capita 1.2 -4.4
(c) Agriculture 4.5 0.0
(d) Industry *1.3 -7.0
(e) Services 1.V -0.3
3. Merchandise trade
(a) Exports3 3.5 -6.4
(b) Imports3 -3-3 -8.0
(c) Terms of Trade -6.5
4. Cocoa production*3
5. Food sector
(a) Food production8 2.0 -2.7
(b) Food production per capita8 -0.3 -5.9
(c) Calorie availability per capita8 1.3 -3.9
(i) from cereals 3.8 -3.3
(ii) from roots and tubers -2.0 -1.8
(d) Protein availability per capita8 14.1 -4.0
6. Inflation
(a) Consumer prices 6‘3d ^ • 9e(b) Food (local and imported) prices 6-6d 53.2(c) Non-food prices 5 . 8 46.5
a World Bank, 1985. ^ Based on data provided by Ghana Cocoa Board, 1986.
c FAO and FAO computer print-outs, 19 8 6. d Based on data in Bequele, 1980, 
Appendix table 7 with the weights for local and imorted food (0.5207 and
0.0295) from the World Bank. 8 Based on data from Ghana Central Bureau of
Statistics.
Source: Adapted from Tabatabai, 1986.
ANNEX - TABLE 2
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, AREA, YIELD TRENDS: 1970-1983
(per cent)
Production__________________  Area________________________  Yield_______________________
Ghana North South Ghana North South Ghana North South
1970-1981
Cereals -2.3 0.4 -5.9 -1.9 0.3 -6.6 -0.4 0.1 0.7Maize -4.2 1.4 -5.9 -4.1 1.9 -6.7 -0.1 -0.6 0.8
Rice -0.4 1.0 -6.1 -1.1 0.3 -6.1 0.7 0.7 -0.1
Millet 0.9 0.9 - 0.5 0.5 - 0.4 0.4 -
Guinea corn -0.1 -0.8 - -1.0 -0.8 - 0.0 0.0 -
Starchy staples -3.7 -1.2 -3.8 -5.0 -2.2 -5.3 1.3 1.0 1.4Cassava -0.4 2.0 -0.4 -1.6 1.3 -1.6 1.2 0.7 1.2Cocoyam -4.5 - -4.5 -5.7 - -5.7 1.2 - 1.2
Yam -6.0 -1.9 -8.7 -6.1 -2.5 -9.7 0.1 0.7 1.0Plantain -8.7 - -8.8 -9-3 - -9.4 0.6 - 0.6
1970-83
Cereals -3.4 -0.9 -7.1 -1.6 0.0 -5.0 -1.8 -0.9 -2.1Maize -6.2 -2.2 -7.3 -3.7 -0.3 -5.1 -2.5 -1.8 -2.2Rice -3.8 -4.2 -4.6 -3.2 -3-5 -3-8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7Millet 0.0 0.0 - 0.7 0.7 - -0.7 -0.7 -Guinea corn -0.8 -0.6 - -0.3 -0.1 - -0.5 -0.5 -
Starchy staples -4.7 -2.7 -4.8 -4.8 -2.3 -5.0 0.1 -0.4 0.2Cassava -2.6 -3-9 -2.5 -2.2 -2.8 -2.1 -0.4 -1.1 -0.4
Cocoyam -4.6 - -4.6 -4.9 - -4.9 0.4 - 0.4
Yam -6.7 -2.0 -10.0 -6.0 -1.8 -10.3 -0.8 -0.2 0.4
Plantain -8.1 “ -8.1 -8.1 - -8.1 0.0 - 0.0
Source: Based on unpublished data Ministry of Agriculture. Unfortunately other unpublished
data from same Ministry are contradictory and all are of doubtful accuracy.
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A N N E X  — TABLE  3
O D P BY IN D U ST R IA L  O R IG IN  AT CONSTANT 1980 PRICES. 1980-1985 
(Million Cedis)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 »
Agriculture . .  ............................ 21,589 21,036 20352 19,187 21,151 21,974
Agriculture and Livestock 14,723 14.607 13.990 12.938 14.880 15.106
Cocoa ............................ 3.979 3,805 3.613 3.322 3.256 3.585
Forestry and Logging 2.216 1,945 2,097 2.263 2.336 2,570
Fishing 672 679 652 664 679 713
Industry 6,533 5,489 4,554 3,986 4,278 4.863
Mining and Quarrying 
M anufacturing
517 479 439 394 409 467
4,197 3.388 2.694 2.555 2.811 3.234
Electricity and W ater 314 351 323 197 183 241
Construction ............................. 1.505 1.270 1.099 840 876 920
Services 12,886 13,315 12,826 13,490 13,987 14,686
Transport and Com munications 1.211 1.292 1.307 1.402 1.446 1.518
Trade and Hotels 4,060 3.982 3.569 3.745 3.972 4.170
Banking. Insurance, Real Estate 2.715 2.836 2.923 3.028 3.115 3.271
Government Services 4,446 4.746 4.549 4.819 4.928 5.175
O ther Services 455 459 479 496 526 552
Imputed Service Charges -890 -1,080 -1,213 -1,289 -1,373 -1,453
Im port Duties . .  ............................ 589 388 250 314 365 383
G D P a t M arket Prices 40,708 39,149 36,770 35,689 38,409 40,453
Per Capita G D P (Cedis) 3.667 3.437 3.145 2.977 3.125 3.208
Population (Million) 11.10 11.39 11.69 11.99 12.29 12.61
• Estimated N ote: Totals m ay not add up due to rounding
Source: Tables 3 to 8 and 11 to 19 adopted - in some cases adapted -
from 1985 and 1987 Government of Ghana Consultative Croup 
Submission, 1985. 1987 Submission is not directly
comparable changing base year to 1975 and altering some
bases of calculation.
A N N E X  — TABLE  4
G D P BY IN D U ST R IA L  O R IG IN  AT CONSTANT 1980 PRICES. GROW TH RATES.
1980-1985
(Per cent)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 *
Agriculture 2 .2 -2 .6 -3 .3 -5 .7 10.2 3.9
Agriculture and Livestock 0.1 -0 .8 -4 .2 -7 .5 15.0 1.5
Cocoa 9.5 —4.4 - 5 0 -8 .1 -2 .0 10.1
Forestry and Logging 2 .0 -1 2 .2 7 .8 7 .9 3 .2 10.0
Fishing 9.1 1.1 -4 .0 1.9 2 .2 5 .0
Industry . - ............................. 0 .3 -1 6 .0 -1 7 .0 -1 2 .5 7.3 13.7
Mining and Q uarrying -3 .1 -7 .3 -8 -4 -10.1 3 .7 14.3
M anufacturing -1 .4 -19 .3 -2 0 .5 -5 .1 10.0 15.1
Electricity and W ater 12.9 11.9 -8-1 -3 8 .9 -7 .4 32.0
Construction ............................. 4 .3 -1 5 .6 -1 3 .5 -2 3 .6 4.3 5 0
Services....................................................... -2 .3 3.3 -3 .7 5 .2 3 .7 5 .0
Transport and Communications -1 3 .2 6.8 1.1 7 .3 3.1 5 .0
Trade and Hotels - 8 6 -1 .9 -1 0 .4 5 .0 6 0 5 .0
Banking. Insurance Real, Estate . . 3 .9 4.5 3.0 3 .6 2 .9 5 0
Government Services 1.8 6.7 -4 .2 5.9 2.3 5 0
O ther S e r v i c e s ............................. 23 .9 0 .8 4 .5 3.7 5.9 5 .0
Im puted Services Charges -2 7 .9 21.3 12.3 6 3 6.5 5 .9
Im port Duties . .  ............................. -9 .1 -34 .1 -3 5 .5 25-4 16.3 5.0
G D P at M arket Prices 1.2 -3 .8 -6 .1 -2 .9 7 .6 5.3
Per Capita G D P ............................. - 1 .4 -6 .3 - 8 5 -5 .4 5 .0 2 .6
Population 2 .6 2 .6 2 .6 2 .6 2.5 2 .6
'Estimated
A N N E X  -T A B L E  5 
G D P BY EX PEN D ITU R E A T CONSTANT 1980 PRICES. 1980-1985 
(M illion Cedis)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 *
Priv«te C o n su m p tio n ............................. 31.189 27.525 25.232 25.575 28.579 30.008
Public Consum ption 7,166 8.293 7.376 7.228 7.396 7.766
Gross Domestic Investment 3.582 3.261 2.506 2.813 3.281 3.445
Gross Domestic Fixed Investment 3,768 3.327 2.566 2.818 3.275 3.438
Changes in Stocks -186 -66 -60 -4 7 7
N et E x p o r t s .......................................... -1.229 70 1.655 73 -847 -889
Exports o f G oods and NFS 4.779 4.360 5.025 3.548 2.993 3.143
Im ports o f  G oods and NFS -6.007 -4,290 -3.369 -3.475 -3.840 -4,032
Gross Domestic Product 40.708 39.149 36.770 35.689 38.409 40.330
Net Factor Income from  A broad -397 -239 -213 -219 -212 -222
G ross National Product 40.311 38.910 36.557 35.470 38.197 40.107
Less Consum ption o f Fixed Capital . . -2,280 -2.308 -2.403 -1.194 -1.185 -1.244
N ational Income ............................. 38.031 36.602 34.154 34.277 37.012 38.863
O ther C urrent Transfers Received
A b r o a d .......................................... 399 325 294 392 508 534
N ational Disposable Income 38.429 36.927 34.447 34,669 37,521 39.397
*Estimated
N ote: Totals may not add up due to rounding
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A N N E X  — TA BLE  6  
G D P BY EX PE N D IT U R E . PERCENTA G E SHARES. 1980-1985
1980 1931 1982 1983 1984 1985*
Private Consumption 76.6 70.3 68.6 71.7 74.4 74.4
Public Consum ption 17.6 21.2 20.1 20.3 19.3 19.3
Gross Domestic Investment 8.8 8.3 6.8 7 .9 8.5 8.5
Gross Domestic Fixed Investment 9.3 8.5 7 .0 7.9 8 .5 8.5
Changes in Stocks -0 .5 -0 .2 -0 .2 .0 .0 .0
Net Exports -3 .0 0 .2 4 .5 0 2 -2 .2 -2 -2
Exports o f G oods and NFS 11.7 11.1 13.7 9 .9 7.8 7.8
Imports o f G oods and N FS -14 .8 - 1 1.0 -9 .2 -9 .7 -1 0 .0 - 1 0 0
Gross Domestic Product 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Net Factor Income from  A broad -1 .0 -0 .6 -0 .6 -0 .6 -0 .6 -0 .6
Gross National Product 99.0 99.4 99.4 99.4 99.4 99.4
Less Consum ption o f  Fixed C apital . . -5 .6 -5 .9 -6 .5 -3 .3 -3 .1 -3 .1
National Income 93.4 93.5 92.9 96.0 96.4 96.4
Other C urrent transfers Received 
Abroad 1.0 0 .8 0 .8 1.1 1.3 1.3
National Disposable Income 94.4 94.3 93.7 97.1 97.7 97.7
‘ Estim ated
PRODUCTION OF MAJOR COMMODITIES AND GENERATION OF ELECTRICITY: 1980-1986
ANNEX - TABLE 7
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Cereals ('000 tons)
Maize
Rice
Other Cereals
382
78
213
376
97
250
346
36
162
172
40
96
574
76
315
395
80
305
495
80
330
Total 673 723 544 308 965 780 905
Cassava ('000 tons) 2,322 2,063 2,470 1,729
(2,529)
4,005
(3,205)
3,075 3,040
Cocoa ('000 tons) 258 224 179 158 175 219 230
Gold ('000 Fine 
Troy Ounces) 353 341 331 277 287 299 288
Diamonds ('000 
Carats) 1,149 837 684 340 346 632 555
Manganese ('000 
long tons)
Bauxite ('000 tons)
250
225
223
181
160
64
173
70
287
49
316
170
332
204
Logs ('000 cubic 
metres) 480 550 410 560 578 620 890
Sawnwood ('000 
cubic metres 150 190 150 189 180 223 232
Hydro-Electricity 
(mn KWH) 5,316 5,373 4,982 2,575 1,819 3,020 3,599
From 1987 Consultative Group submission. Substantial revisions 
of some entries from 1985 as far back as 1 9 8O.
-J-
ANNEX - TABLE 8 
PRICE INCREASES (NATIONAL CPI) 1980-1986
Total Non-Food Food
1980 50 - _
1981 116 - _
1982 22 - _
1983 122 100 145
1984 40 69 11
1985 12 35 -11
1986 (Est.) (33) (50) (15)
- k -
ANMEX - TABLE 9 
REAL WAGES/SALARIES 1980-1985
1980 1982 1983 198*1 1985
Real wage 
ratios
1985 over 
1983
A. Unskilled labour
Civil service 322 419 329 354 712 2.16
Public corporations 6*47 525 416 406 709 1.70
Private sector 729 677 442 508 876 1.98
B. Semi-skilled labour
Civil service 398 476 355 373 737 2.08
Public corporations 718 553 429 416 737 1.72
Private sector 855 764 480 591 914 1.90
C. Supervisor/Junior manager 
Civil service 698 716 467 452 846 1.81
Public corporations 1,280 1,110 676 590 941 1.39
Private sector 1,985 1,835 1,332 1,278 1,978 1.48
D. Accountants
Civil service 1,194 1,090 641 576 1,016 1.59
Public corporations 1,739 1,468 843 708 1,159 1.37
Private sector 2,217 3,367 1,931 1,794 2,792 1.45
E. Engineer/Other
senior professional
Civil service 1,273 1,149 668 595 1,043 1.56
Public corporations 1,951 1,593 905 753 1,259 1.39
Private sector 3,785 3,367 1,931 2,140 3,220 1.67
F. Senior management
Civil service 1,808 1,858 877 701 1,188 1.35
Public corporations 2,286 2,091 1,038 847 1,578 1.52
Private sector 6,872 6,035 3,627 3,733 5,126 1.41
Source: World Bank
ANNEX - TABLE 10
RECONSTRUCTED BUDGET ACCOUNTS CLERK: LATE 1985
INCOME Cedi
Net Pay Slip 2,150
Housing Allowance ¿130
Other Allowances 570
Tips, Sales Memos, etc. 1,250 (*4,250)
Wife - Vegetable Selling 3,500
Wife - Other Informal 500 (*4,000)
Other Household Members 1,000 ( 750)
Total Income 9.000
EXPENDITURE
Pay Day Chop ("day we must enjoy") 
Weekday Chop (evening only)
Weekend Chop (morning/evening) 
Other Chop
Children's Food Pocket Money
Clerk's Lunch Money
Transport to Work (communal taxi)
Rent
Water Electricity 
Education/Medical, etc. 
Clothing/Household Supplies 
Football/Lotto/Beer/Cigarettes
750
3,000
1,600
500
*400
*400
600
300
150
100
600
600
1,3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2
2,*4 
1,5
( 6 , 6 5 0 )
9.000
1. Paid by Clerk or mixed.
2. Dominantly paid by Wife.
3. Chicken Cedi *450; Other Cedi 300.
*4. Implicitly j shirt, 1 metre cloth, 2 cakes soap a month.
5. Implicitly 3 bottles beer, *40 cigarettes, 1 football match,
2 Lotto forms a month:
Source: Adapted From West Africa 27-1-86 and fragmentary data on
expenditure, income patterns. Estimate roughly squares with 
World Bank quasi survey suggesting wage earning household 
expenditure four times wages and over two thirds on food. 
Raises doubts as to appropriateness 50Í food weight in Cost of 
Living Index.
ANNEX - TABLE 11 
MERCHANDISE EXPORTS AND SALE OF ELECTRICITY, 1980-1986
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986*
Cocoa Beans
Value (US$ million) 709 401 384 252 352 376 483
Volume ('000 tons) 211 190 239 159 150 171 198
Cocoa Products
Value (US$ million) 84 41 34 27 30 36 36
Volume ('000 tons) 23 14 16 15 15 16 18
Gold
Value (US$ million) 190 159 122 102 103 91 106
Volume ('000 Fine Troy
Ounces) 348 346 302 278 286 285 288
Timber
Value (US$ million) 34 36 16 15 21 29 48
Volume ('000 cubic metres) 185 219 111 103 126 247 354
Residual Oil and Electricity
Value (US$ million) 56 51 48 34 43 68 67
Others
Value (US$ million) 31 23 38 16 18 32 33
Total
Value (US$ million) 1,104 711 642 441 566- 632 773
«
Estimated Based on 1987 submission
ANNEX - TABLE 13 
EXTERNAL CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS, 1983-1988
(US$ Million)
1983
Actual
1984
Provi­
sional
1985
Estima­
ted
1986
Projected
1987 1988 
Projected Proji
Capital Required 485 522 657 800 927 985
Current Account Deficit 218 201 346 405 463 476
IMF Repurchases 0 4 0 19 137 207
Amortization (Official) 125 115 236 256 208 204
Payment Arrears 34 60 60 60 60 53
Capital N.E.S. 109 107 14 10 10 10
Increase in Reserves 0 35 0 50 50 35
Assumed Capital Available 485 522 657 800 927 985
Official Dev. Asst. 145 259 288 535 550 550
Loans 84 133 200 294 303 295
Grants 61 125 88 241 247 255
Medium-Term Loans 68 55 198 164 155 155
Supplementary Borrowing 0 0 0 41 175 225
Private Borrowing 12 -11 46 52 33 31
Direct Foreign Investment 2 2 6 8 14 24
IMF Purchases 259 218 120 0 0 0
Memorandum Items:
Exports of Goods and NFS 477 613 647 756 917 1,057
Imports of Goods and NFS 642 791 933 1,110 1,310 1,458
Interest Payments including
IMF Charges 82 101 111 152 173 190
IMF Charges 20 21 -47 -45 -42 -32
Debt Service Ratios
Excluding IMF 39.1% 31.8% 46.4% 47.4% 36.9% 34.3%
Including IMF 43.2% 35.9% 53.7% 55.8% 56.5% 56.9%
Including IMF and Arrears
Reduction 50.3% 45.6% 62.9% 63.6% 63.0% 61.9%
As % Gross Capital Inflows 56% 58% 65% 67 i% 68% * 6 75%
* Excluding Supplementary Borrowing and Debt Service thereon
ANMEI - TABLE 12
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1983 - 1989 
(US i Million)
Exporta (F.O.B.)
Cocoa 
Non-Cocoa 
Imports (F.O.B.)
Oil
Non-Oil 
Trade Balance 
Services (Net)
Of vhlch: Interest PaymentsJ/ 
Unrequited Transfer (Net)
Private
0thers2/
Current Account Balance 
Covemaent Capital (Net)
Grant¿/
LonE-Tenn Loans (Net)8/
Cross Inflows 
Amortization 
Medium-Term Loans (Net)
Cross Inflows 
Amortization 
Trust Fund 
Private Capital (Net)<)/
Direct Investment 
Suppliers' Credits 
Others
Capital Account Balance 
Errors and Omissions 
Overall Balance 
Monetary Movementa
IMF (Net)J/
Payments Arrears 
Supplementary Borrowing 
Increase in Reserves])/
Others
1983 Actual 1989 Provisional
1439 566
269 382
171 189
-500 -616
-195 -161
-355 -955
-6 1 -50
-186 -229
-82 -101
29 78
17 79
12 9
-218 -201
88 197
61 125
15 89
89 133
-69 -50
13 -11
68 55
-55 -659/
0 -1
13 -9
2 2
12 -11
61 -85
163 109
-187 20
-293 -78
293 78
259 219
-39 -60
0 0
0 -35
18 -916/
Notes! J/ Inoludes profits and dividends.
2/ Consists of technical assistance, pension payments and others.
3/ Excludes technical assistance.
J/ Excludes the amount of the Nigerian oil credit paid during 1981!. 
5/ Negative numbers mean Increase in reserves.
5/ Includes the amount of the Nigerian oil credit paid during 1989.
] /  Excludes possible new standby or Structural Adjustment Facility
Drawings.
8/ 1985-1989 data not broken down by maturity.
£/ For 1985-1989 lumped in other.
/unrex - TABLE 12
BALANCE OP PATIWTS, 1985 - 19«9 
(OS * Million)
1985 1986
Kst-
uttd
1987
Pro­
jected
1988
Pro­
jected
1989
Pro­
jected
Exports Of Which 632 773 777 815 920
Coca (112) (519) (175) (190) (521)
1 [651 [68] [62] [58] [56]
Imports Of Which -726 -780 -891 -985 -1073
Oil (199) (-125) (-118) (-153) (-158)
Trade Balance -91 -7 -HR -110 -153
Non Factor Services (Net) -110 -131- -151 -172 -182
Resource Balance -201 -138 -268 -312 -335 '
Net Factor Income -111 -105 -113 -125 -125
Net Private Transfer 32 19 50 80 120
Current Account Balance 283 -191 -331 -357 -3 1 0
Financed By! Crants 93 115 162 157 191
Official Medium And Long 
Term Loans (Net) 39 111 261 217 222
Disbursements (287) (358) (118) (121) (396)
Amortization (-218) (-218) (-15D (-178) (-173)
Other Capital 19 -70 13 71 29
Errors And Omissions 16 -18 - - -
Capital Accounts (Net) 167 138 139 178 115
Overall Balance -117 -56 . 108 121 106
Monetary Movements 117 56 -108 -175 -123
Of Which Net IMF_1/ 112 17 -102 -235 -161
Arrears Reduction -57 -1 -26 -72 -73
Financing Cap2/ * - 79 203 118
Res Implicit ♦ * Fall *62 ♦ 13 -59 -17 -20
Notes! 1/ Capital Receipts excludes borrowings by Bank of Chana.
2/ Does not take into account purchases under future programe with 
the IMF or resources from the Structural Adjustment Facility.
-p-
ANNEX - TABLE 14 
EXTERNAL DEBT END 1985
Total $ 2.4 billion
(IMF__________ .656)
Multilateral .792 
Bilateral .966
Bank/Others .442
Arrears______. 200
Interest/Exports 21.6%
Debt/Exports 355%
Debt/GDP 23Í
-q-
SCHEDULE OF COMMITMENTS AND DISBURSEMENTS, 1985-89 
(US $ Million)
ANNEX - TABLE 15
Actual
1985
Project
Pro­
gramme/
Sector
Food/
Com­
modity Total
Undisbursed Balance 31/12/84 
1985 Signed Commitments 
Disbursements 
Exchange Rate Adjustment
291
262
103
140
196
80
83
29
41
541
487
224
1986
Undisbursed Balance 31/12/85 
1986 Signed Commitments 
Disbursements 
Exchange Rate Adjustment
446
217
124
253
143
189
70
31
44
769
391
357
+56
Projected
1987
Undisbursed Balance 31/12/86 
19 8 7 Signed Commitments 
Disbursements
577
295
186
220
230
199
62
50
43
859
575
428
1988
Undisbursed Balance 31/12/87 
1988 Signed Commitments 
Disbursements
686
342
219
251
240
202
69
53
48
1006
635
469
1989
Undisbursed Balance 31/12/88 
1989 Signed Commitments 
Disbursements
809
351
254
289
230
188
74
55
45
1172
636
487
1990
Undisbursed Balance 906 331 84 1321
ANNEX - TABLE 16
AID COMMITMENTS BY DONORS, 1984-86 
(US % Million)
Members of the CG for Ghana 1984 1985 1986
Bilateral
Canada 45 33 23France 1 12 25
Germany 18 13 24Italy 1 16 1
Japan 4 36 14
Switzerland 6 9 6U.K. 10 11 26
U.S.A. 21 17 11
Sub-total (Bilaterals) 105 147 130
Multilateral
ADB 31 79 29
BADEA
Development in Africa 0 9 0
E.E.C. 57 26 31
E.I.B. 10 0 37-
F.A.O. 0 0 0
I.F.A.D. 0 0 0
U.N.D.P. 4 4 4
W.F.P. 79 8 9
World Bank 125 187 93
Sub-total (Multilaterals) 306 313 203
Observers at the CG for Ghana
Australia 1 0 0
Brazil 0 0 0
C.D.C. 0 1 24
China 0 0 0
Denmark 0 5 0
India 0 . 0 °*Korea 0 0 0
Kuwait Funds 0 0 0
Netherlands 13 6 18
Norway 0 0 0
Spain 0 0 ' 0
O.P.E.C. Fund 0 6 0
Saudi Fund for Development 0 9 13
NGOs 0 0 3
Sub-total (Observers) 14 27 58
Grand Total 425 487 391
Note 1. Data converted at exchange rates prevailing at end of year indicated.
2. Data may not add up due to rounding.
ANNEX - TABLE 16b
AID DISBURSEMENT BY DONORS 198H-86 
(US $ million)
Donor 198*4 1985
Revised
1986
Consultative Group Members
Bilateral
Canada *45 15 114
France 1 0 0
Germany 27 18 22
Italy 1 2 1
Japan 6 17 16
Switzerland 6 i4 9
U.K. 18 12 21
U.S.A. 23 17 13
Sub-total (Bilaterals) 119 85 96
Multilateral
ADB/ADF 1U 22 20
BADEA 0 0 0
E.E.C. 47 13 33
E.I.B. 6 2 3
F.A.O. 0 0 0
I.F.A.D. 0 2 2
U.N.D.P. 3 14 14
U.N.I.C.E.F. 0 2 3
W.F.P. 1*4 114 25
World Bank 5*1 72 166
Sub-total (Multilaterals) 138 131 255
Others
Australia 0.5 0 0
Brazil 0 0 0
C.D.C. 0.7 1 1
China 0 0 0
Denmark 0 0 0
India 0 0 0
Korea 0 0 0
Kuwait Funds 0 0 0
Netherlands 0 7 5
N.G.0.s 0 0 0
O.P.E.C. 0 0 0
Saudi Fund 0 0 0
Spain 0 0 0
Sub-total (Others) 1.2 8 6
Grand Total (C.G. Members & Others 285 22*4 357
Note 1. Data converted at exchange rates prevailing at time of disbursements.
2. Data may not add up due to rounding.
ANNEX
TABLE 1 7 Main Economic Indicators (Average
Annual Change: X)
Consumer
Price
Index
Real GDP 
Total Per 
Capita
Exports Imports Maize
Output
1980 50.1 1.2 -1.4 3.6 12.5
1981 116.5 -3.8 -6.3 -35.6 5.1 -I
1982 22.3 -6.1 -8.5 -9.8 -38.2 -8
1983 121.9 -2.9 -5.4 -31.5 -1.8 -50
1984 NO 7.6 5.0 28.9 23.2 233
1985 (Est) 1 20.0 5.3 2.6 7.8 18.0 -5
1. CPI actual 12. GDP actual probably underestimated because 
1.5% food output growth estimate appears incompatible with 
11% food price decline and food exports.
ANNEX - TABLE 18 Sources and Uses of Foreign Exchange, 1983-85
(Million $)
SOURCES USES
1983 1984 1985 1983 1984 1985
Own Sources
Exports (fob) 439 566 610 Imports (fob) 500 616 727
Service (Receipts) 
Total
39 
4 78
49
615
38
648
Service
Payments 225 278 319
External Sources Amortiza­
tion 124 115 236
Grants
Long-term Loans 
Medium-term Loans
Private Capital 
and Transfers 
(Net)
61
84
68
103
125
133
55
-17
88
200
198
88
Long-term Loans (69) 
Medium
term Loans (55)
(50)
(65)
(33)
(203)
Reduction in
payments
arrears 34 60 60
IMF disbursements 259 218 120
Others 1/ 
(Net) 170 60 0
Total 575 514 694
Total Resources 1053 1129 1342 Total Uses 1053 1129 1342
Memo Items:
Per Cent Increase 
in Total Resources 7 19
Own Sources 
as per cent of 
Total Resources 45 54 57
1/ Includes movements in short-term monetary and non-monetary capital, 
change in official reserves, and errors and omissions.
ANNEX - TABLE 19 
ERP MAJOR ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL INDICATORS (1984-89)
(Provisional)
Actual Estimates Target Projections
1984 1985
Growth Rates
GDP 8.6* 5.1*
GDP Deflator 35.3% 3 1 -2*
Percent of Market Price GDP
National Accounts:
Consumption 95.1% 95.7*
Investment 7.6% 7.3*
Private 4.0* 3.4*
Budgetary Cap. Expenditures 3-6* 3-8*
National Savings 4.7* 3.1?
Public -0.4* 0.1*
Private 5.1* 3.0*
Of which: Foreign Transfers 1.0* 0.5*
Foreign Savings 2.8* 4.2?
Central Government Budget:
Total Revenues 8.0* 10.4*
Total Expenditure 11.8* 14.1*
Recurrent 8.4? 10.3?
Capital 3.4? 3.8*
Special Efficiency 0.0* 0.0*
Overall Deficit 3.8* 3-8*
Balance of Payments
Exports of GNFS 8.0* 9.9*
Imports of GNFS -10.7* -12.9*
Resource Balance -2.7? -3.0*
Current Account Balance -2.8* -4.2*
Overall Balance -1.6* -1.7*
Broad Money (M2) 15 12
1986 1986 1987 1988 1989
5.3* 5.5* 5.0* 5.3* 5.3?
30.2* 18.20* 18.0* 12.5* 7.5?
92.3* 95* 89.8* 86.7* 85.0*
10.3* 14* 17.1* 21.0? 22.8*
4.4* 5* 7.9* 11.1* 11.9?
5.9* 9* 9.2* 9.9* 10.8?
6.6* 6* 8.5* 12.2* 14.8?
1.7* 2* 3.2* 3-5* 3.6?
4.8* 4* 5.3* 8.7* 11.2?
0.9* 1* 1.3* 2.0* 2.8?
3-7* 7* 8.6* 8.8* 7.9?
1 3 .6* 12* 16.1* 16.2* 16.5?
17.8* 20* 22.8* 23.6* 24.4?
11.9* 11* 12.9* 12.7* 12.9?
5.9* 6* 9.2* 9.9* 10.8*
0.0* 3* 0.7* 0.9* 0.6?
4.1* 8* 6.6* 7.4* 7.9*
15.8* 14* 21.7* 22.2* 22.7'
-18.5* -20* -28.6* -3 0.0* -30.5/
-2.6* -6* -7.0* -7-7* -7.8;
-3.7* -8* -8.6* -8.8* -7.9?
-1.1* +2* 2.8* 3.0* 2 .5;
16 15 18 20 22
- w -
ANNEX - TABLE 20
SELECTED QÜALITT Of L O T  INDICATORS: 
I960 - KID 1960'S
Chin» 
I960 1970
Late
1970'■ 19»0'
Average Life Expectancy
Saharan Africa (1962)
at Birth 95 99 55 53 98
2. Infant Hortallty Rate 132 107 86 107-120 118
3. Child Death Rate 27 21 15 25-30 29
9. Access to Health 
Facility (b) - - - 30 95
5. Public Health Facility 
Visits Per Person 
Per lear . 0.7 0.9 2(f)
6. Health Budget as 
Í of GDP - 1.2 - 0.26 0.95
7. Access to Pure Water (c) 
Rural 19 19 98 19
Urban - 86 86 75 62Total - 35 35 60 22
8. Access to Excreta 
Disposal (d)
Rural 90 90 30 25
Urban - 92 95 65 69
Total - 55 56 99 32
9. Average Calorie Avail­
ability as a f of 
requiresents 92 97 88 68 91
10. Child Malnutrition 
(Moderate/Severe) - - 36 50-55 90
11. Primary Education 
Enrolment Ratio (e) 38(96) 69(75) 69(80) -(80) 69 (—)
12. Adult Literacy 27 30 - 35-95 99
13- Education Budget as 
Í of GDP - 3-9 - 0.85 2.81
19. Proportion of Population 
below Absolute Poverty 
Line (f)
Rural 60-65 67-1/2- 65
Urban m 30-35
72-1/2
95-50 35
Principal Sources: World Bank, Comparative Analysis and Data Division,
Economic Analysis and Projections Department (June 1989), 
World Development Report 1985; UNICEF, Statistics on 
Children in UNICEF Assisted Countries (April 1985); UNICEF 
Ghana: Situation Analysis of Women and Children (July 
1989).
Notes: a) i960 data refer to a year between 1959 and 1961; 1970 between
1969 and 1971; late 1970's between 1975 and 1980; 1980's to 
1982, 1989 or 1985.
b) Defined in terms of location within a 5 kilometre radius. Hay
overstate for urban population when facilities available are
small to serve the entire population nominally within reach of 
them.
c) 1970 and late 1970's urban figures may be overstated by failing 
to relate lumber of water points to population.
d) 1970 and 1978 figures for urban and possibly rural areas
overstate by failing to relate number of drop—holes to supposed 
user population.
e) Adjusted for length of primary cycle. ( ) are unadjusted 
figures. Because of the primary/middle school division Ghana 
has a shorter primary cycle than most SSA countries.
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